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Abstract
Disqualification of judges generally is governed by Rule 1.432 and
Florida Statutes chapter 38. Grounds which will support a suggestion
of disqualification are stated in section 38.02.
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I. Judges and Counsel
A. Disqualification of Judges
Disqualification of judges generally is governed by Rule 1.432 and
Florida Statutes chapter 38. Grounds which will support a suggestion
of disqualification are stated in section 38.02. Where the basis for dis-
qualification is prejudice, an applicant must file an affidavit stating the
facts and reasons for the movant's belief that bias or prejudice exists.'
The affidavit "shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith."' 2
Although the judge must determine the legal sufficiency of the motion
for disqualification, she "shall not pass on the truth of the facts al-
l. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1985).
2. Id.; see Parsons v. Motor Homes of America, Inc., 465 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no error in judge's refusal to recuse where motion legally insuffi-
cient for failure to allege facts and reasons for belief of bias or prejudice and failure to
file certificate of counsel).
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leged" in a legally sufficient motion.' A judge who undertakes to con-
trovert the asserted grounds for recusal assumes an adversarial posture,
and on that basis alone is disqualified.4 The remedy for a judge's re-
fusal to recuse herself is sought by petition for writ of prohibition filed
in the appropriate appellate court.'
The rulings made before recusal of a judge are not invalid.8 How-
ever, an order entered simultaneously with an order of recusal is inva-
lid.7 "[A] successor judge may not modify or otherwise disturb an un-
appealed final order of his predecessor permanently enjoining the use of
a business name ... ." A successor judge who has not heard all the
evidence may not make determinations of fact or enter final judgment
except after retrial or upon stipulation of the parties to use of the rec-
ord of prior proceedings as the basis for the judgment. 9
B. Counsel
1. Generally
The Third District Court of Appeal in Lackow v. Walter E. Heller
& Co. Southeast, Inc.10 found that the plaintiff's counsel should have
been disqualified because an appearance of professional impropriety
was created, contrary to the provision of Canon 9 of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, when a secretary who was employed by the
defendant's counsel left the firm and went to work for plaintiff's coun-
sel. The court noted that the defendant's firm consisted of only two
lawyers, that the secretary had been primarily involved in the case and
continued to be involved in the case in her employment with the plain-
tiff's firm.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Hub Financial Corp. v.
3. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432(d); Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
4. Gieske v. Moriarty, 471 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
5. See Mangina, 462 So. at 602; Gieske, 471 So. 2d at 80.
6. Foresight Enters., Inc. v. Leisure Time Properties, Inc., 466 So. 2d 283 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1985).
7. Barnett Bank v. Garrett, 468 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
8. Master Cleaners v. Chantres, 471 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
9. See Paragon Group, Inc. v. Hoeksema, 475 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985), petition for review denied, 486 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1986).
10. 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1986]
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Olmetti11 decided that a trial court erred in allowing counsel for a cor-
poration to "withdraw on the day of trial without granting a continu-
ance to permit [the corporation] to obtain new counsel ....
Florida Statutes section 454.18 guarantees the right of self-repre-
sentation. The Third District Court of Appeal in Herskowitz v. Her-
skowitz13 quashed an order of an administrative law judge which re-
quired parties to be represented by counsel. The court distinguished
another Third District case1 4 in which the court "prohibited self-repre-
sentation to prevent abuse of court proceedings and interference with
the orderly process of judicial administration."15
2. Attorney's Fees
(a) Frivolous Actions
Section 57.105, Florida Statutes,"6 is designed to discourage frivo-
lous civil litigation by permitting courts to award fees against losing
parties who bring meritless actions.17 Attorney's fees statutes are nar-
rowly construed,1 8 The Florida Supreme Court in Whitten v. Progres-
sive Casualty Insurance Co.19 upheld the constitutionality of the stat-
ute and identified incipient district court standards for use by trial
courts in determining whether to award fees under the statute. The
action must be found "so clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and
11. 465 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
12. Id. at 619.
13. 466 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
14. Shotkin v. Cohen, 163 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
163 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1964).
15. Herskowitz, 466 So. 2d at 9.
16. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1985) provides: "The court shall award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party in any civil action in which the court finds that
there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the
losing party."
17. Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1982).
18. The rationale supporting narrow construction has been based on a premise
that such statutes are "in derogation of the common law." See Whitten, 410 So. 2d at
505. However, the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v.
Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), stated that this premise is "histbrically incorrect,"
and that the statutes rather are exceptions to a general American rule that "attorney
fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of
the parties." Id. at 1147-48.
19. 410 So. 2d at 501.
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the law as to be completely untenable." 20 A frivolous attempt to create
a controversy justifies such a finding.21 The statute "may not be ex-
tended to every case and every unsuccessful litigant."2 "Merely losing,
either on the pleadings or by summary judgment, is not enough to in-
voke the operation of the statute. '2 3 The entire action, not merely a
portion of it, must be meritless. 24
Fees may not be awarded under section 57.105 merely because
"events during the course of a lawsuit ... reveal that the litigation is
not sustainable."2 5 Fees may not be awarded against a party who
merely defends a judgment on appeal.2 6 Where an action is voluntarily
dismissed as to some parties, but the action raised justiciable issues
against them, those dismissed may not recover fees under the statute.2 7
In a case of first impression, the Fourth District in Ferrara v.
Caves28 stated that fees may be awarded against an intervenor under
section 57.105. The case arose when three town commissioners sought
to have enjoined and declared void a recall petition which had been
initiated against them. Although the commissioners originally sued the
deputy town clerk and the town, the person who initiated the recall
petition was granted leave to join as an indispensable party. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioners on the
ground that the recall petitions were legally insufficient. The court also
awarded fees against the losing parties, which included the intervenor,
under section 57.105. The district court reversed the award of fees,
20. Id. (quoting Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 384 So. 2d 171, 175 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis in
original)).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing City of Deerfield Beach v. Oliver-Hoffman Corp., 396 So. 2d 1187
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 407 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 1981)).
23. Id. at 504 (citing City of Deerfield Beach and Allen).
24. Glover v. School Board of Hillsborough County, 462 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
25. Greater Clearwater Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Gray, 464 So. 2d 594
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
26. McNee v. Biz, 473 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
27. Poliard v. Zukoff, 482 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); accord
Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for
review denied, 486 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1986) (voluntary dismissal of one of the party
defendants not related to merits of case but rather for strategic purpose; error to award
fees where issue of negligence was raised against party who was dismissed).
28. 475 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 479 So.
2d 118 (Fla. 1985).
1986] 899
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stating that the standard that must be met to win a summary judgment
is not the same as that required to support a finding of frivolousness,
which must be supported by competent substantial evidence. 2 The dis-
trict court found that although the parties eventually reached a stipula-
tion that the recall petition was legally insufficient and the intervenor
accordingly lost on the merits, the intervenor had raised a justiciable
issue of law which precluded an award of fees. The district court ex-
pressed concern that a contrary result might have a chilling effect on
Florida's recall mechanisms.
The Fifth District affirmed an award of fees against a plaintiff
who initiated an action for ejectment and trespass against one whom he
erroneously believed was the owner of adjoining property.30
(b) Frivolous Appeals
Florida Statutes section 57.105 has been invoked by district courts
in awarding fees as penalties for frivolous appeals.31 In Menkes v.
Menkes3 2 the district court awarded appellate attorney's fees because it
regarded as "completely frivolous" a challenge to an equitable distribu-
tion of marital assets which was "plainly within the discretion of the
trial court under the Canakaris3s doctrine." 34 The Third District also
awarded fees against an insurer whose arguments on appeal were char-
acterized by the court as "patently frivolous."'35
The Fifth District in Beasley v. Beasley 6 warned that motions for
fees under section 57.105 would be "favorably entertained"37 in appeals
relating to alimony awards where no record or stipulated statement was
presented to the reviewing court. That court subsequently acted on its
warning and awarded appellate attorney's fees where an appellant chal-
29. Id. at 1299.
30. Parrino v. Ayers, 469 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for re-
view denied, 479 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1985).
31. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.400(b) governs awards of appellate attorney's fees, which
may not be awarded "unless otherwise permitted by substantive law." Id. at R. 9.400
committee notes on 1977 Revision.
32. 478 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
33. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
34. Menkes, 478 So. 2d at 457.
35. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Gelfand, 477 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
36. 463 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
37. Id. at 1248.
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lenged a trial court's order increasing child support payments.3 8 No
record was made of the trial court proceedings. The appellant did not
take advantage of Rule 9.200(b)(3),39 which permits appellants to sub-
mit "statement[s] of the evidence or proceedings from the best availa-
ble means, including . .. recollection. '40 The district court character-
ized the appeal as "spurious" 4' because without a transcript or a Rule
9.200(b)(3) statement, the court had nothing upon which to evaluate
the trial court's factual determination. The Fifth District seems to have
disregarded the permissive nature of Rule 9.200(b)(3), and under pen-
alty of section 57.105 has required that either a transcript or a Rule
9.200(b)(3) statement be presented on appeal.
(c) Wrongful Acts
Fees may be awarded to "an innocent party drawn into litigation
with a third party by the wrong of another party. '4 2 Glace and Rad-
cliffe, Inc. v. City of Live Oak'3 involved a suit by a surety on a per-
formance bond against the city and an engineering firm after a general
contractor defaulted on a sewage construction project. The city pre-
vailed on its cross-claim for indemnity against the firm, which a jury
found was negligent in its work on the project. The district court af-
firmed an award of fees to the city. Similarly, in Auto-Owners Insur-
ance Co. v. Hooks,44 the district court affirmed an award of fees to a
party who was forced to defend title to a car because of a prejudgment
writ of replevin which was wrongfully obtained.
(d) Fee Contracts
Agreements that the prevailing party's fees shall be paid by the
losing party are indemnificatory in nature.45 As such, the amount of the
fee awardable is the lesser of the amount agreed. to by the prevailing
38. Nicholason v. Bryant, 468 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
39. FLA. R. App. P. 9.200(b)(3).
40. Id.
41. Nicholason, 468 So. 2d at 312.
42. Glace & Radcliffe, Inc. v. City of Live Oak, 471 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st
Ct. App. 1985).
43. Id.
44. 463 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
45. Dunn v. Sentry Ins., 462 So. 2d 107. 108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. Ann. 19
Dist.
85
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party and her attorney or the amount which has actually been paid.4
That amount must be reasonable; that is, it must not be "excessive"
within the meaning of that term in Florida's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.47 Where the actual fee is found excessive, the court should
award a reasonable fee.4R Contractual provisions governing attorney's
fees are strictly construed.49
Fees may not be awarded under a contract against a partner who
was not a party to the contract which created the partnership con-
tract.50 Fees may be awarded under contract to one who defended a
suit which was voluntarily dismissed. 51 Fees may be awarded under the
"common fund rule" only in the absence of a controlling contract or
statute52 and only where certain criteria are met.53 Fees ordinarily may
not be awarded where no basis for an award is pleaded or proved.5 4
The First District Court of Appeal in Cheek v. McGowan Electric
46. Id.; accord Pezzimenti v. Cirou, 466 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.),
review dismissed sub nom. Musca v. Cirou, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985).
47. Id.; see FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(b); ac-
cord Ennia Schadeverzekering, N.V. v. Buzinski, 468 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); see also Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145
(Fla. 1985) (discussing lodestar process).
48. Hurley v. Slingerland, 461 So. 2d 282, 283-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
49. Id.
50. Hatch v. Dance, 464 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
51. Dunn, 462 So. 2d at 109.
52. Hurley, 461 So. 2d at 283-84.
53. The court in Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Constr. Co., 341 So. 2d
759, 761 (Fla. 1976), stated that attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party
from a fund created or brought into court through an attorney's services. The Fourth
District, in a second Hurley decision, 480 So. 2d 104, 107-108 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985), recited a five-part test which must be satisfied for the rule to apply:
1. The existence of a fund over which the court has jurisdiction and from
which fees can be awarded;
2. The commencement of litigation by one party which is terminated
successfully;
3. The existence of a class which received, without otherwise contributing
to the lawsuit, substantial benefits as a result of the litigation;
4. The creation, preservation, protection or increase of the fund as a di-
rect and proximate result of the efforts of counsel for that party;
5. A reasonable relationship between the benefit established and the fees
incurred.
54. See American Housing and Dev. Corp. v. Sun Island Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 4
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Brown v. Brown, 473 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (trial court erred in awarding fees without evidentiary hearing).
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Supply Co.55 ruled that fees may be awarded under a contract after
final judgment even though the claim for fees was not presented to the
jury. This ruling conflicts with decisions in the Second, Third, and
Fifth Districts in which those courts held that claims for fees under
contract are elements of damages which require determination by the
jury.56
The Fifth District affirmed an award of fees in a section 1983
suit5 7 on a post-judgment motion to tax costs where there was no
prayer for fees in the original complaint.58 The court stated that the
federal statute gives courts discretion to award fees to prevailing par-
ties as part of the costs of litigation, and that costs, as opposed to dam-
ages, need not be pleaded. 59
The Second District reversed awards against losing parties' attor-
neys where the awards were not authorized by statute, contract, or the
common fund rule and where the awards were ordered as penalties for
improper attorney conduct.60
The attorney general provides free representation to circuit court
judges in suits for damages alleging that judicial immunity should not
apply because a judge acted "in the clear absence of jurisdiction. '61
The Fifth District affirmed a trial court's ruling that the fees of an
attorney privately retained by a judge to defend a suit against him may
55. 483 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
56. Id. at 1380-81. The First District certified this question as one of great pub-
lic importance:
Where attorney's fees are pled in a successful suit for recovery pursuant to
a promissory note, and the note provides that the maker shall pay "reason-
able attorney's fees," may the proof of such fees be presented for the first
time after final judgment pursuant to a motion for attorney's fees by the
prevailing party?
Id. at 1381.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
58. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1327 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985); cf. Compton v. Gator Office Supply and Furniture, Inc., 471 So. 2d 216 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (award of fees reversed where trial court failed to .reserve
jurisdiction to award fees).
59. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1327.
60. See American Bank v. Hooven, 471 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(where trial court found attorney's conduct which lead to mistrial was not contemptous,
no authority to award fees and expenses as sanction); Israel v. Lee, 470 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no authority to hold attorney personally liable for appel-
late attorney's fees of prevailing opposing party, even when contempt rulings against
client and attorney were jointly appealed).
61. Salfi v. Ising, 464 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1986]
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not be awarded under section 57.105 against the losing party.62 The
court did not decide whether the attorney general could be awarded
fees under section 57.105.63
In C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc.64 the Florida Supreme
Court found that a prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action may be
entitled to fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes,6 5 only where the
party recovers an amount greater than a prior settlement offer.6 The
court distinguished Rule 1.442, which provides only for awards of costs
incurred after an offer of judgment where the amount recovered by the
party who rejected an offer does not exceed the amount offered.6"
The Fifth District in George v. Northcraft68 decided that although
one who accepts an offer of judgment under Rule 1.442 may be re-
garded as a "prevailing party" under a contractual provision entitling
that party to fees, where an accepted offer makes no reference to fees,
the party is precluded from later seeking them. The court noted that
such fees are unliquidated and are part of the prevailing party's dam-
ages.69 Thus, where the offer does not reserve to the accepting party a
right to seek fees, any claim for fees is deemed included in the claim
for damages, which was satisfied by the offer and acceptance of
judgment.
II. Pleadings
A. Generally
A complaint must make specific allegations of fact to support the
elements of a cause of action. 0 It is improper to draft a complaint so
that subsequent counts incorporate by reference all the paragraphs of
all the preceding counts. 1
62. Id. at 689.
63. Id. at n.2.
64. 472 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1985).
65. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1981).
66. C.U. Assocs., 455 So. 2d at 1110.
67. Id.; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
68. 476 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
69. Id. at 759.
70. See, e.g., Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1985) (complaint alleging
liability of state agency for personal injury inflicted by escaped prisoner insufficient as
matter of law on elements of causation and foreseeability; insufficient allegations of
fact on claim of impropriety and bad faith).
71. Frugoli v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
[Vol. 10
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The Florida Supreme Court in Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cot-
ton72 found that the second count in a two-count pleading was fatally
defective for misjoinder of claims and parties. Two plaintiffs sued a
common defendant and his employer. The first count of the complaint
alleged tortious interference with a business relationship enjoyed by one
of the plaintiffs. The second count consisted of the other plaintiff's alle-
gation of battery. The court found that the causes of action were sepa-
rate and the plaintiffs' interests not identical. 73 The misjoinder was not
cured through incorporation by reference of the first count in the
second.74
Rule 1.190(b) provides that pleadings may be amended to conform
to the evidence. It further provides that issues not presented by the
pleadings but nonetheless tried by the parties are to be treated as if
raised in the pleadings although no formal amendment was made. 5
B. Counterclaims
Counterclaims generally are governed by Rule 1.170.76 A counter-
claim may be stricken and dismissed as a sanction for failure to furnish
discovery. 77 An order dismissing a compulsory counterclaim is nonfinal
and not reviewable by interlocutory appeal.7 8 An order denying a mo-
tion for leave to amend a counterclaim is also nonfinal and nonreview-
able.79 The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Allie v. Ionata0 ex-
1985).
72. 463 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1985).
73. Id. at 1128.
74. Id.
75. Cf. Wassil v. Gilmour, 465 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (where
statute of limitations barred action on oral loan contract and subsequent promises to
repay created new causes of action, plaintiff failed to raise this theory at trial and
defendant's failure to object to testimony about the promises did not justify amendment
under the rule where the testimony was relevant on other grounds and thus not objec-
tionable); 99 Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Crider, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. May 8, 1985) (error to permit amendment at close of evidence based on
theory of damages suggested by witness whose name did not appear on witness list)
(motion for rehearing filed May 20, 1985).
76. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170.
77. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(C); Cedars Assoc. v. E.R. Brownell & Assocs.,
Inc., 466 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
78. Dennis v. Pavlokos, 464 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
79. Sciabbarrasi v. Uddo, 466 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
80. 466 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), cause dismissed, 469 So. 2d 749
(Fla. 1985).
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amined the extent of recovery obtainable through the defense of
recoupment raised in response to a counterclaim. lonata sued Allie for
recision and restitution on real estate contracts on grounds of fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. Allie prevailed on an affirmative defense that
the applicable statute of limitations had run and maintained a counter-
claim for the unpaid balance on purchase money notes for the property.
Ionata defended against the counterclaim by raising the defense of re-
coupment in a "counter-counterclaim" on the basis of constructive
fraud. The Fifth District decided that the defense of recoupment was
permissible. Although the statute of limitations barred Ionata from ini-
tiating an action based on constructive fraud, Ionata was free to raise
the fraud as a defense to Allie's counterclaim.8' However, the court
was persuaded by a decision of the Third District 2 and decided that
Ionata's recovery should be limited by the amount sought by Allie in
his counterclaim. The court acknowledged conflict with Cherny v.
Moody,83 in which the First District permitted affirmative recovery on
a counterclaim in recoupment although the claim would have been
time-barred as an independent action. The Fifth District certified the
question to the supreme court.84
A timely amendment to a counterclaim (or any other pleading)
that asserts a claim or defense that "arose out of the conduct, transac-
tion or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading" relates back
to the time of the original pleading. 85 "Even where there is a change in
the legal theory upon which the action is brought, or in the legal
description of the rights to be enforced, the amendment relates back if
it is based on the same factual situation."8 " The Second District re-
viewed a case in which a plaintiff sought discharge of a mechanic's lien
and the defendant timely brought a counterclaim seeking foreclosure
on the lien. The counterclaim was dismissed with leave to amend. An
amended counterclaim was filed later than the twenty days within
which a lienor must show cause why the lien should not be discharged
81. Id. at 1111-13.
82. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. De Mirza, 312 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
83. 413 So. 2d 866 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
84. "Does the running of the statute of limitation on an independent cause of
action bar the recovery of an affirmative judgment in recoupment on a compulsory
counterclaim?" Id. at 869.
85. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
86. Wen-Dic Constr. Co. v. Mainlands Constr. Co., 463 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 482 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1986).
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as required by Florida Statutes section 713.21(4).17 The district court
noted that a "counterclaim seeking to foreclose [a] mechanic's lien is a
proper means to avoid cancellation of the lien" under the statute,88 and
found that the show cause requirement was satisfied and the lien im-
properly discharged by the trial court because the amended counter-
claim related back.
The plaintiff in Quality Coffee Service, Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.89 sued for breach of contract and the defendant
counterclaimed for breach of contract and express warranty. With
leave of the court, the defendant amended its counterclaim to allege
fraud and civil theft, and demanded a jury trial. The First District
Court of Appeal quashed the trial court's order denying a jury trial.
The court began its well-reasoned analysis by observing that a demand
for a jury trial must be made in compliance with Rule 1.430(b), or else
the right to trial by jury is waived."' When leave is given to amend a
counterclaim and new issues triable of right by jury are presented by
the amendment, "the time for demand of jury trial is revived, despite
an initial waiver."91 When the original complaint is in equity and the
counterclaim injects a legal issue, the legal issue may be tried sepa-
rately before a jury unless the legal issue is so "similar or related to"
the equitable issue that the finding of fact in the equitable proceeding
would "bind the legal fact finder" and thus operate to "deprive the
legal counterclaimant of his right to trial by jury."92 The district court
found that the factual elements common to causes of action based on
breach of contract and warranty, fraud, and civil theft entitled the de-
fendant to jury trial on all the issues raised by its counterclaim. 93
III. Parties, Witnesses, and Jurors
A. Parties
Rule 1.210(a) provides that a nominal beneficiary under a con-
tract may prosecute in its own name, even though it is not the real
party in interest. The Third District Court of Appeal in Corat Interna-
87. FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1983).
88. Wen-Dic, 463 So. 2d at 1188.
89. 474 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
90. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d).
91. Quality Coffee Serv., 474 So. 2d at 429.
92. Id. at 429.
93. Id.
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tional, Inc. v. Taylor94 accordingly reversed a trial court's ruling that a
party who was not the real party in interest could not properly prose-
cute an action in its own name. A consignor shipped goods under a
C.I.F. (shipment) contract. Title passed to the consignee upon delivery
to the carrier. The consignee bore the risk of loss. The consignor caused
insurance on the goods to be purchased in its own name. Some of the
goods were destroyed during shipment. The consignor paid for replace-
ment of the goods and sued on the insurance contract. The trial court
entered summary judgment for the insurer because the consignor was
not the real party in interest under the insurance contract. The district
court reversed on the basis of Rule 1.210(a). The Florida rule differs
from its federal counterpart, Rule 17(a), which requires that "[e]very
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."9 5
Rule 1.260(a)(1) permits substitution of parties within ninety days
after service of notice of the death of a party. The ninety day period
may be extended upon a showing of excusable neglect,96 inadvertance,
or mistake.9 7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Stroh v. Dudley98
held that "Rule 1.260(a)(1) does not require mandatory, non-discre-
tionary dismissal even in light of the terminology 'shall be dismissed as
to the deceased party.' " The court reversed an order dismissing a
counterclaim with prejudice for failure to timely substitute a personal
representative after the death of a counterclaimant. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Downey expressed his view that the mandatory lan-
guage of the rule should be followed unless "the party has procured an
extension of time prior to expiration of the ninety days or unless he can
bring himself within the purview of Rule 1.540(b) . . .,,"'
The individual members of a partnership are generally regarded as
indispensable parties to an action brought in behalf of the partnership,
because "[e]ach partner is deemed to have an interest in the chose in
94. 462 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 471 So.
2d 44 (Fla. 1985).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a); see Corat Int'l, 462 So. 2d at 1187 n.2.
96. See Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied sub nom. Hayslip v. Somero, 476 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985) (revers-
ing order dismissing cause where plaintiff's attorney failed to timely seek substitution
of decedent's estate as party defendant).
97. Stroh v. Dudley, 476 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dis-
missed, 482 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1985).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 232 (Downey, J., dissenting).
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action .... "101 This rule protects defendants from exposure to the
possibility of multiple suits and liability arising from the same claim.102
The composition of the partnership may be such that the rationale sup-
porting treatment of the partners as indispensible parties is inapplicable
as, for example, where claims by or against some of the partners are
time-barred. 10 3 The composition of a partnership is a question of fact
which may not be resolved by a trial judge on a directed verdict.104
B. Witnesses
The common law rule permitting sequestration of witnesses has
not been codified in the Florida Statutes or adopted as a rule of
court.10 5 The rule is invoked "to avoid the coloring of a witness' testi-
mony by that which he has heard from other witnesses who have pre-
ceded him on the stand." 10 6 The Third District Court of Appeal in Del
Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon07 decided that a new trial was required
where an attorney attempted to impeach the credibility of a witness by
cross-examining him about a suspected violation of the rule. The dis-
trict court stated that the attorney had usurped the function of the trial
court by determining whether the rule was violated and what remedy
was appropriate.108 The court outlined the procedure which should be
followed when a witness' compliance with the court's order is
questioned.109
In a pretrial order, a court may limit the names of the witnesses
101. DeToro v. Dervan Invs. Ltd., 483 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Waterfront Developers, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 467 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530
(Fla. 1985) (no error in failure to add two additional members of law firm under
circumstances).
102. DeToro, 483 So. 2d at 721.
103. See Farish v. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 12, 16 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), modified, 464 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1985).
104. See DeToro, 483 So. 2d at 721-22.
105. Del Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon, 466 So. 2d 1167, 1170 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
106. Id. at 1170.
107. Id. at 1167.
108. Id. at 1170-71; see also FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-108(G): "A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a
venireman or a juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror or a member of his
family, of which the lawyer has knowledge."
109. See Del Monte, 466 So. 2d at 1171.
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who may be called. For example, the court may order the parties to
exchange witness lists and forbid testimony by unlisted witnesses. 110
This pretrial practice serves as an aid to case management. It also
serves as a discovery function in that disclosure of witnesses helps pre-
vent unfair surprise and "trial by 'ambush.' """ The Third District
Court of Appeal in Capital Bank v. G & J Investments Corp."2 de-
cided that a new trial was necessary where an expert witness was per-
mitted to testify although his identity had not been disclosed, as was
required by a pretrial order. The expert, who was a handwriting ana-
lyst, presented damaging testimony about a sequence of events which
was determinative of liability on a negotiable instrument. The court
found that the party against whom the testimony was offered was
prejudiced by the testimony because the party was unprepared to con-
duct cross-examination of the witness. The court further found that the
party was unable "to cure the prejudice ... and that [the] noncompli-
ance with the pretrial order was not in good faith.""'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal decided in 99 Broadcasting
Co. v. Gulfstream Broadcasting Co. 1 4 that a party should not have
been permitted to amend its pleadings to add a new issue in conformity
with testimonial evidence of a witness whose name did not appear on a
witness list. The list had been furnished without a court order. The
court reasoned that the outcome of the case may have been affected
because the jury may have based its verdict on the new theory of dam-
ages raised by the witness. The district court directed the trial court on
remand to order the parties to stipulate to the witnesses they would
call.
C. Jurors
1. Jury Selection
Florida Statutes chapter 913 and Rule 1.431 provide for peremp-
tory challenges1 5 and challenges of jurors for cause." 6 Neither the rule
110. See generally FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
111. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Fla. 1981).
112. 468 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
113. Id. at 535.
114. 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (motion for rehear-
ing filed May 20, 1985).
115. FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1985); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(d).
116. FLA. STAT. § 913.03 (1985); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(c).
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nor the statute states the time for making a peremptory challenge in
civil actions. However, in a criminal trial, the "defendant has a right to
retract his acceptance and object to a juror at any time before the juror
is sworn." 117 There is conflict among the districts over whether in a
civil action the "trial court [may] require the parties to exercise all of
their peremptory challenges simultaneously in writing where the origi-
nal panel has been thoroughly examined and challenges for cause exer-
cised, and there remain sufficient members to comprise a jury after all
peremptory challenges have been exhausted."""" The Third District has
approved this method and twice certified the question to the supreme
court.119 The Fourth District has disapproved the method, opining that
the trial court "must permit either party to 'exercise any remaining pe-
remptory challenges at any time before the jury is sworn."12 0
The First District in Video Electronics, Inc. v. Tedder'z' reviewed
a trial court's limitation of the use of backstrikes in the jury selection
process. The court permitted only one round of backstrikes before
swearing some members of the jury panel. Counsel were not permitted
to use peremptory challenges after the full panel was obtained. The
district court found this procedure was contrary to the "better prac-
tice" recommended in King v. State122 and operated to deny the parties
the effective and intelligent use of their peremptory challenges. '123 The
court stated that the better practice is to permit counsel to consider the
panel as a whole when exercising peremptory challenges. 124 Finding
that unnecessary limitations on the use of peremptory challenges had
brought many cases before the appellate courts, the court in Video
Electronics announced a rule intended to guide trial courts in the exer-
cise of their discretion over the jury selection process: "[W]henever a
trial court exercises its discretion to . . . determine whether potential
jurors should be sworn before the entire panel is selected . . . , the
record should reflect substantial reasons therefore arising from excep-
117. Dobek v. Ans, 475 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); accord King
v. State, 461 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.310.
The exercise of this right is known as "backstriking." Dobek, 475 So. 2d at 1267.
118. Oliver v. Ghisiawan, 478 So. 2d 104, 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
119. Id. (quoting Ter Keurst v. Miami Elevator Co., 453 So. 2d 501, 501 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
120. Dobek, 475 So. 2d at 1268.
121. 470 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
122. 125 Fla. 316, 169 So. 747 (1936).
123. Video Electronics, 470 So. 2d at 8.
124. Id.
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tional circumstances in the particular case.' 1 25 The court certified the
question to the supreme court."2 6
The Fourth District in Battle v. Safeway Insurance Co.'2 7 cau-
tioned trial courts "to be certain that prospective jurors are selected on
purely a random basis. The jurors themselves should play no role in
determining whether they are called to the box."12 In another case,
that court cautioned that "the impartiality of the finders of fact is an
absolute prerequisite to our system of justice. Close cases should be
resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to
his or her impartiality.' 129
The Third District in City of Miami v. Cornett'30 decided that
"both parties may challenge the alleged improper use of peremptory
challenges to exclude from jury service prospective jurors solely on the
basis of race."'' The court thus adopted the rule of the criminal case
of State v. Neil'32 for application in civil actions. The court reasoned
that the right to jury trial afforded by the Florida Constitution' 3 would
be meaningless without a requirement that the jury be impartial.'
2. Post-Trial Interviews of Jurors
Rule 1.431 (g) provides that a party who believes grounds exist to
challenge a verdict may move the court for an order permitting inter-
view of jurors to find out whether the verdict is subject to challenge. 3 5
The rule requires that the movant state the grounds for the challenge.
125. Id.
126.
In the absence of substantial reasons arising from exceptional circum-
stances shown to exist in the particular case, is it an abuse of discretion for
a trial court to employ a jury selection procedure in which some but not all
prospective jurors are sworn for the purpose of prohibiting the exercise of
peremptory challenges to backstrike such jurors?
Id. at 9.
127. 468 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
128. Id. at 463.
129. Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So. 2d 533, 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
130. 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
131. Id. at 400.
132. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
133. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
134. Cornett, 457 So. 2d at 402.
135. See also FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-29; id.
DR 7-108(D).
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The movant must allege specific facts and the challenge must not be
based on matters which "inhere in the verdict," but rather must be
based on matters that are "extrinsic to the verdict." '136 For example, an
allegation that a juror misunderstood the verdict is inadequate. 137 An
allegation that jurors improperly considered the finances of tortfeasors
is likewise inadequate. 38 However, an allegation that a bailiff improp-
erly told the jurors that they could not communicate with the judge is
adequate. 39 Notice and hearing on the motion are required. 40
IV. Jurisdiction Over the Person
A. Service of Process on Natural Persons
Process and service of process generally are governed by Florida
Statutes chapter 48 and Rule 1.070. Proper service effected through
compliance with the applicable statute is necessary for a court to obtain
personal jurisdiction over a defendant."4' Process may be served by the
local sheriff or his appointee, " 2 or by a court-appointed server.' 43
When a return of service is regular on its face,144 a presumption of
136. Dover Corp. v. Dean, 473 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
137. See id.
138. See Clark v. Merritt, 480 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), peti-
tion for review denied, 488 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1986).
139. See Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. Silva, 476 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
140. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g).
141. See, e.g., Smith v. Import Birds, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). While service on nonresident defendants in compliance with an applicable
statute and rule is sufficient to satisfy the notice component of the process due those
defendants under the fourteenth amendment, plaintiffs of course must have proper ba-
ses for asserting that a Florida court or a federal court applying Florida law should
have jurisdiction over the persons of the nonresidents. The United States Supreme
Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985), decided that plain-
tiffs who sue under a provision of Florida's long-arm statute, FLA. STAT. §
48.193(1)(g), through which the legislature has attempted to confer jurisdiction over
nonresidents who breach contracts in this state, must show more than mere facial com-
pliance with the statute. In addition, plaintiffs must satisfy the constitutional due pro-
cess requirements stemming from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), and its progeny. See generally Note, Due Process Limits the Reach of Flor-
ida's Long-Arm Statute in Bringing Contract Defendants to the Home of the Whop-
per, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 127 (1986).
142. FLA. STAT. § 48.021 (1985).
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(b).
144. The return of execution of process is governed by FLA. STAT. § 48.21 (1985)
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valid service arises which may be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. 145
The Third District Court of Appeal was twice faced with chal-
lenges to service on the ground that the persons served were not "resid-
ing" at the defendants' usual places of abode within the meaning of
section 48.031(1)."' The court in Magazine v. Bedoya147 decided that
a mother-in-law enjoying a six week stay at the defendant's residence
satisfied the statutory requirement. However, in Montano v.
Montano141 the court found that the presumption of valid service was
overcome where evidence showed process was served at the defendant's
residence upon a visitor who spoke no English.
Service of process not only determines jurisdiction over the person,
but may also determine venue. "When two actions between the same
parties are pending in different circuits, jurisdiction lies in the circuit
where service of process is first perfected. ' 149 The Second District
Court of Appeal in Radice Corp. v. Sound Builders, Inc.150 examined a
rather complicated chronicle of events to determine where service was
first effected when opposing parties filed suits very close in time in dif-
ferent circuits over the same contractual dispute. Radice's attorney had
agreed to accept service on behalf of his client and had thus waived the
necessity of service of process. The court ultimately determined that
Sound Builders' complaint was received by Radice's attorney in the
mail before service of Radice's summons was perfected. Thus, venue
lay in the circuit where Sound Builders filed.
In a suit on a guaranty of payment of a promissory note, the Third
and FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(b).
145. Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf.
Gonzalez v. Totalbank, 472 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (return facially
defective).
146. FLA. STAT. § 48.031(1) provides:
Service of original process is made by delivering a copy of it to the
person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or other initial
pleading or paper or by leaving the copies at his usual place of abode with
any person residing therein who is 15 years of age or older and informing
the person of their contents. Minors who are or have been married shall be
served as provided in this section.
147. 475 So. 2d at 1035.
148. 478 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
149. Mabie v. Garden Street Management Corp., 397 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1981),
quoted in Radice Corp. v. Sound Builders, Inc., 471 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
150. 471 So. 2d at 86.
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District in Gonzalez v. Totalbank'5' found that a return of service
upon one of the defendants was facially defective for failure to comply
with Florida Statutes section 48.21.152 The court further found that a
general appearance by an attorney retained by another of the defend-
ants did not operate to waive objection to lack of personal jurisdiction
by a defendant who had not engaged the attorney's services.
Section 48.171 provides that substituted service on nonresident
motor vehicle owners may be effected on the secretary of state as agent
for that defendant. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Journell v.
Vitanzo'53 found that a complaint which alleged that the defendant
was a Florida resident and did not allege concealment of whereabouts
was facially insufficient to permit service on the secretary of state as
agent.
B. Service of Process on Corporations
Service of process on corporations generally is governed by Florida
Statutes section 48.081.154 The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Space
Coast Credit Union v. First'"5 found that a final default judgment was
void because jurisdiction was not perfected. The server, who was an
employee of a firm engaged in the subpoena service business, was not
authorized under section 48.021 to serve process. Further, the service
did not comply with section 48.081 because it was made on a low-level
employee with no attempt in the first instance to serve higher-level cor-
porate functionaries.
Substituted service of process on a corporation's designated regis-
tered agent'56 is authorized by section 48.081(3). If a corporation fails
to designate a registered agent as required by section 48.091, service
may be made upon "any employee at the corporation's place of busi-
ness.' 157 The Fourth District in Sierra Holding, Inc. v. Sayner58 de-
cided that attempted service under this provision was ineffective be-
cause the person served in the defendant's office was not an employee.
Strict compliance with the statute is required for effective substi-
151. 472 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
152. FLA. STAT. § 48.21 (1979).
153. 462 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
154. FLA. STAT. § 48.081 (1985).
155. 467 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
156. See FLA. STAT. § 48.091 (1985).
157. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(3) (1985).
158. 469 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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tuted service on a nonresident under section 48.161.151 The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of showing compliance. "Once the defendant
makes a prima facie showing of failure to comply, the burden again
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the statute's applicability." 160 In
Major Appliances, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co., 6' the
Third District reviewed a plaintiff's attempted substituted service on a
nonresident defendant under section 48.161(1). A notice of suit was
sent by certified mail to a member of the corporation's board of direc-
tors at the address listed in the last annual report filed before the cor-
poration was involuntarily dissolved. The returned receipt was marked
"unclaimed" and "unknown." The court held that "where the nonresi-
dent defendant doing business in the state fails to file a correct address
for the purpose of substituted service, plaintiff's attempt to effect ser-
vice at the address furnished by the defendant is valid."' 2 This deci-
sion marks a departure from the strict compliance with the statute or-
dinarily required for effective substituted service.
C. Constructive Service of Process by Publication
Florida Statutes chapter 49 permits constructive service of process
by publication when personal service cannot be had. In a dissolution of
marriage action, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Whigham v.
Whigharnm' decided that a trial court was without jurisdiction to adju-
dicate certain property rights because the published notice of action did
not describe the property proceeded against, as required by section
49.08(4). Because the husband did not receive notice that his interests
in property were to be adjudicated, he was denied the process due him
under the Constitution.
In an action seeking foreclosure on a mortgage on real property,
the Fifth District in Tompkins v. Barnett Bank'" decided that service
by publication was effective although the affidavit in support of service
159. Smith v. Import Birds, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985); but cf. Major Appliances, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 561
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (plaintiff excused from strict compliance with statutory
requirements where nonresident corporate defendant doing business in state failed to
file correct address for purpose of substituted service).
160. Smith, 461 So. 2d at 1027.
161. 462 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
162. Id. at 563.
163. 464 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
164. 478 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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required by sections 49.031 and 49.041 contained an incorrect mailing
address. The affidavit did contain the defendants' correct residential
address, which the court found was sufficient.
V. Discovery
The rule governing the scope of discovery is that "[p]arties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant
to the subject matter of the pending action .... Information may
be discovered regardless of its admissibility at trial, provided that "the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." 166 Matters are discoverable only if "rele-
vant to the subject matter of the litigation. A matter is relevant if it
tends to establish a fact in controversy or to render a proposition in
issue more or less probable.'1 67 Certiorari is the appropriate procedure
for obtaining review of discovery orders, because "erroneously com-
pelled disclosure, once made, may constitute irreparable harm which
cannot be remedied by way of appeal.' 68
A. Privileges
1. Attorney-Client
Matters protected by the attorney-client privilege are outside the
scope of discovery. 69 The court must determine whether the privilege
165. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
166. Id.
167. Oil Conservationists, Inc. v. Gilbert, 471 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (discovery of corporate books and records not relevant to action seeking
imposition of statutory penalty for corporation's denial of demand by shareholder to
inspect books and records); see Baron, Melnick & Powell, P.A. v. Costa, 478 So. 2d
492 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to order production of documents where no
allegation or showing of relevancy to subject matter of action or relation to a claim or
defense); Whitman v. Bystrom, 464 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (post-
assessment discovery of taxpayer's financial records not relevant to issue in litigation).
168. Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy, 471 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); accord Carson v. Jackson, 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Baron, Melnick & Powell, P.A. v. Costa, 478 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
169. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1); Gross v. Security Trust Co., 462 So. 2d
580 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Merlin v. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Inc., 479
So. 2d 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (medical malpractice plaintiff's handwritten
notes "prepared for and transmitted to [his] attorney either in contemplation of or
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protects a matter. 170 The attorney-client privilege yields to the general
requirement of disclosure found in Florida's Public Records Act,17' ex-
cept that records in an agency attorney's litigation files reflecting a
"mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory" are
exempted from disclosure until the conclusion of the litigation. 17 2 The
scopes of the discovery permissible under the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Public Records Act are not coextensive.' 73
2. Work Product
The work product privilege applies only to matters "prepared in
contemplation of litigation."'1 74 A mere likelihood of litigation is not
sufficient.17 5 While the attorney-client privilege, if applicable, is abso-
lute, work product may be discovered upon a showing of need and un-
due hardship. 76 The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Airocar, Inc.
during the litigation and kept confidential throughout" were protected by attorney-cli-
ent privilege); see also FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1985).
170. See Gross, 462 So. 2d at 581 (court properly made in camera examination
of tape to determine existence of privilege).
171. FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1985).
172. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o) (1985); see City of Melbourne v. A.T.S. Mel-
bourne, Inc., 475 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (court properly ordered
city attorney to appear at deposition and bring notes, memoranda, and correspondence
between attorney and city relating to enactment of ordinances where order stated that
scope of deposition would be limited by § 119.07(3)(o)); see also Brevard County v.
Nash, 468 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that "all state, county
and municipal records are controlled by the Public Records Act"; emphasis in original;
question on this issue certified); see generally Smith, The Public Records Law and the
Sunshine Law: No Attorney-Client Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work
Product Exemption, 14 STETSON L. REV. 493 (1985); Comment, Florida's Open Gov-
ernment Laws: No Exceptions for Attorney-Client Communications, 13 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 389 (1985).
173. Department of Professional Regulation v. Spiva, 478 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (grade reports exempt from disclosure under Florida Public
Records Act are discoverable in administrative proceeding).
174. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turtle Reef Assocs., 444 So. 2d 595, 596
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
175. Id.
176. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(3) of this rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discover-
able under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that party's repre-
sentative, including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or
918 [Vol. 10
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v. Goldman'7 found that a bus driver's written report of an incident
was not privileged because the record failed to show the report was
made in contemplation of litigation. The court explained that because
the driver was required to report every incident, if the standard were
read too broadly, every document, photograph, or tangible item would
be protected because every incident could conceivably result in litiga-
tion. However, because the record showed that the statements elicited
from the driver by management were part of an investigation for a
pending suit, those statements were protected. The court encouraged
trial courts to make specific findings about whether matters were pre-
pared in contemplation of litigation.
The Second District has adopted a more expansive view of the
work product privilege. In Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy17 9
the court extended protection to materials in Cypress Gardens' accident
investigation file which were prepared by the corporation's insurer
before a claim was filed. Although the trial court found the documents
and photographs "were only obtained in the 'mere likelihood of litiga-
tion,' and ordered their production," 80 the district court quashed the
order on policy grounds. The court stated that a contrary result would
penalize entities who were diligent in promptly investigating potential
claims.' 8'
The Third District has examined the scope of discovery of expert
witnesses under Rule 1.280(b) and held that "reports prepared by ex-
perts expected to testify at trial are not protected by the work product
privilege and are discoverable.' 8 2 The court noted that Rule 1.280 is
derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which permits such
discovery.18 3 The court agreed with a note in which the federal advisory
agent, only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has need of
the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.
177. 474 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
178. Id. at 270.
179. 471 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
180. Id. at 204.
181. Id. (citing City of Sarasota v. Colbert, 97 So. 2d 872, 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1957)); see also Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for review denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1985) (grocery
store's internally produced accident reports protected).
182. Mims v. Casdemont, 464 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
183. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
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committee stated that "discovery of expert trial witnesses [is] needed
for effective cross-examination and rebuttal in 'cases present[ing] intri-
cate and difficult issues as to which expert testimony is likely to be
determinative.' "184
In a toxic shock syndrome case, the First District has held that
"scientific and technical documents or tangible things prepared [by a
company's in-house scientists and staff] in anticipation of litigation"
may be protected as work product. 18 5 The court further decided that
certain outside research received by the company was not protected
and noted that there is no academic privilege recognized in Florida.'86
3. Other Privileges
Florida also recognizes a psychotherapist-patient privilege, 8 7 and
by statute protects the proceedings of medical review committees. 8
The constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination was
involved in two cases presenting discovery issues. In Carson v. Jack-
184. Mims, 464 So. 2d at 643. In another case dealing with discovery of experts,
but not in the context of work product, the Fourth District held that "a request for
admissions pursuant to Rule 1.370(a) is an inappropriate method in the first instance to
obtain discovery regarding another party's expert." Continental Ins. Co. v. Cole, 467
So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985). A party must first seek discovery
through interrogatories under Rule 1.280(b)(3)(A) (discovery of experts expected to
testify at trial) or proceed under subsection (b)(3)(B) (discovery of experts not ex-
pected to testify).
185. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Swilley, 462 So. 2d 1188, 1193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
186. Id.
187. See Carson v. Jackson, 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(psychotherapist-patient privilege in FLA. STAT. § 90.503(2) yields to § 415.512, which
provides for abrogation of the privilege in cases involving child abuse or neglect); Hall
v. Spencer, 472 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (tort defendant's record of
alcohol abuse treatment protected by psychotherapist-patient privilege; exception under
FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4) inapplicable where defendant patient did not place his emo-
tional condition in issue as element of defense).
188. FLA. STAT. § 768.40(5) (1985); see HCA of Florida, Inc. v. Cooper, 475 So.
2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (protection of FLA. STAT. § 768.40(4) (1983)
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.40(5) (1985)) not overcome where no showing of
exceptional necessity or extraordinary circumstances); Suwanee County Hosp. Corp. v.
Meeks, 472 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (proceedings and records of
hospital medical staff meeting protected where requirements of FLA. STAT. § 768.40
were satisfied).
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son"89 the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that records of a
court-ordered examination by a psychologist as a condition of probation
in an unrelated criminal case were discoverable in a negligence and
child-abuse action. The court reasoned that any statements to the psy-
chologist were made with the understanding that they would be dis-
closed to others. Because the privilege was not asserted at the time of
the session with the psychologist, the defendant's statements were not
compelled. 119 The court noted, however, that although the psychothera-
pist-patient priyilege is abrogated as to communications dealing with
child abuse, other defenses to discovery such as irrelevancy and imma-
teriality might apply.19'
The Fourth District in Austin v. Barnett Bank of South Florida,
N.A. "' 2 decided that failure to produce documents under Rule 1.380(d)
may be excused where a party makes a belated assertion of fifth
amendment privilege. The court construed a part of the rule providing
that failure to make discovery may not be excused when based on ob-
jectionability unless a protective order was sought and decided this pro-
vision should be inapplicable to objections on grounds of privileges. The
court opined that "rule 1.380(d) does not require timely objection to
privileged matters," and certified conflict with a decision of the First
District.19 3
In a case of importance to the increasing litigation surrounding the
AIDS epidemic, the Third District decided that the identities of blood
donors should be protected from discovery by a plaintiff who alleged he
contracted the disease through a blood transfusion. The court in South
Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen9 4 reached this conclusion by
applying a balancing test under Rule 1.280(c), weighing the plaintiff's
interests against the donors' privacy interests under the Federal and
Florida Constitutions and the institutional and societal interests in the
free flow of donated blood. The court certified the issue to the supreme
court as a question of great public importance. 9 5
189. 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. .1985).
190. Id. at 1192.
191. Id.
192. 472 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
193. Id.; see American Funding, Ltd. v. Hill, 402 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
194. 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
195. Id. at 804 n.13.
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B. Discovery in Aid of Execution
Rule 1.560 permits judgment creditors to obtain discovery under
the rules to find assets on which to levy execution. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Lumpkins v. Amendola'98 found that compelled
attendance at a deposition was a proper sanction against a defendant
who failed to furnish discovery on a judgment awarding child support,
arrearages, and attorney's fees. The Third District in Citibank, N.A. v.
Plapinger9 7 decided that federal income tax returns and other financial
records of partnerships in which a judgment debtor was general partner
were not privileged and were discoverable. The court found that the
information was relevant and "reasonably likely to disclose" assets and
that the debtor had not asserted a need for protection.'9 8
C. Discovery on Claims for Punitive Damages
A plaintiff who properly states a factual basis to support a claim
for punitive damages may discover a defendant's financial resources. 98
Because the threat of such discovery might be used coercively by plain-
tiffs against innocent defendants to force settlement, a court in ruling
on a motion for protection under Rule 1.280(c)(3) may consider
"whether or not an actual factual basis exists for an award of punitive
damages. '2 00 Accordingly, in a legal malpractice action, the Fifth Dis-
trict in Solodky v. Wilson 2 0 examined the standards governing the suf-
ficiency of claims for punitive damages and ruled that a trial court
erred in denying protection where the allegations in the complaint were
insufficient.
D. Discovery Sanctions
Rule 1.380 provides that a party may move for an order compel-
ling discovery, and provides penalties for failure to comply with a dis-
covery order. The severity of the punishment must be commensurate
with the violation. 02 Sanctions enumerated in the rule include orders
196. 466 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
197. 461 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
198. Id. at 1027.
199. See generally Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1979).
200. Id. at 1170.
201. 474 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
202. Harless v. Kuhn, 403 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 1981).
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striking pleadings and dismissing actions or entering judgment, 203 and
orders of contempt.20 4
The Fifth District in Wallraff v. T.G.L Friday's, Inc. 205 decided
that a trial court may dismiss an action with prejudice as a sanction for
a plaintiff's failure to appear at a deposition although no order compel-
ling appearance has issued. Conflict with cases in the Third and Fourth
Districts was certified.20 6
VI. Default
Rule 1.500 provides that a clerk or a court may enter a default
"[w]hen a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to
file or serve any paper in the action .... If the party "has filed or
served any paper in the action," only a court may enter default, and
203. See Pey v. Turnberry Towers Corp., 474 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (order striking pleadings and entry of default judgment for failure to
timely file answers to interrogatories too harsh under the circumstances); Campagna
Constr. Co. v. Riverview Condominium Corp., 467 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (trial court properly struck pleadings and entered default judgment for "contin-
ued and willful" violations of discovery orders); Cedars Assocs. v. E.R. Brownwell &
Assocs., 466 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court properly struck and
dismissed counterclaim as discovery sanction); Weck v. Weck, 464 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court properly struck defenses under Rule 1.380(b)(2)(C)).
204. See Tubero v. Ellis, 472 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (con-
tempt citation inappropriate where element of intent not shown and defendant techni-
cally complied with order of post-judgment discovery in aid of execution by deposition);
Sun-Crete, Inc. v. Sun Deck Prods., Inc., 473 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (evidence too speculative to support amount of compensatory fine for contempt
relating to discovery order).
205. 470 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
206. Id. at 734; see Rashard v. Cappiali, 171 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Reliance Builders v. City of Coral Springs, 373 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
207. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(a); see Building Inspection Servs. v. Olemberg, 476
So. 2d 774, 774 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that "a letter filed in a cause by
an officer of a defendant corporation, advising the court that the corporation is at-
tempting to engage an attorney to represent it, constitutes a 'paper' under Rule
1.500(a) .... "); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b); Fernandez v. Colson, 472 So. 2d 868 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("stipulation of counsel for respective parties agreeing to a
mutual restraining order which was filed as part of the record constituted a 'paper'
within the meaning of" Rule 1.500(b)); Reicheinbach v. Southeast Bank, 462 So. 2d
611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (letter confirming agreement to extend time before
foreclosure constituted a paper served).
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the party "shall be served with notice of the application for default." '
Relief from a default judgment may be obtained under Rule 1.540(b).
Florida courts espouse a liberal policy in favor of setting aside defaults
and deciding causes on their merits. 0 9
Reasonable doubt about whether a default should be vacated
should be resolved in favor of vacation.210 On review of an order dispos-
ing of a motion to set aside a default, an appellant must show a gross
abuse of discretion.21' A movant for vacation of default must show "a
meritorious defense and ... a legal excuse for failure to comply with
the rule." '212 Grounds for relief include excusable neglect and meritori-
ous defense,2 13 mistake,214 due diligence,21 5 inappropriate sanction, 16
208. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b); see Connecticut Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Guson, 477
So. 2d 665 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (parties whose answers were stricken with
leave to amend were entitled to service and hearing on motion for default); Bloom v.
Palmetto Fed. Savs. and Loan Ass'n, 477 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(error to enter default without adequate notice); Fernandez v. Colson, 472 So. 2d 868
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (unnecessary to show excusable neglect or meritorious
defense in motion to set aside and vacate where notice of application for default not
given); Austin v. Papol, 464 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary
judgment on counterclaim imposed as sanction for failure to appear at depositions im-
proper without hearing on whether failure to appear was willful or in bad faith).
209. Reicheinbach v. Southeast Bank, 462 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
The court in Locklear v. Sampson, 478 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
held that a trial court erred in denying a motion to set aside a default judgment which
established paternity. The court stated that because of unknown collateral conse-
quences flowing from an adjudication of paternity, such a judgment "should not be
entered solely upon the basis of unadmitted and unproven allegations of paternity... ;
rather, it should be based upon some competent, substantial evidence." Id. at I 115.
The court in Hobbs v. Florida First Nat'l Bank, 480 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985), decided that a party whose demand for trial was untimely because it was made
after default was nevertheless entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages because
her coparties had made a timely demand.
210. Kindle Trucking Co. v. Marmar Corp., 468 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
211. Id. at 504.
212. Id.
213. See Marine Outlet v. Miner, 469 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) ("[t]o justify setting aside a default, the defaulted party must show both excusa-
ble neglect and a meritorious defense"; excusable neglect shown where telephone con-
versation with secretary to plaintiffs' attorney lead defendant to believe plaintiffs would
not seek default if answer not filed within 20 days); La Nacion Newspaper, Inc. v.
Santos Rivero, 478 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court erred in
refusing to set aside default where court clerk erred in filing answer after default when
Rule 1.500(c) required return of papers, no engagement in dilatory tactics evident,
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timely motion to set aside default and affidavit stating basis for excusable neglect filed,
and answer showed meritorious defense) (subdivision (c) has been amended, effective
Jan. 1, 1985, and now provides that the clerk shall file papers submitted after default
and notify the party that a default has been entered); Kindle Trucking, 468 So. 2d at
502 (delay in answer caused by language in summons which was ambiguous about
whether a party was served in his capacity as individual or as corporate representative
constituted excusable neglect where followed by prompt motion to set aside clerk's de-
fault); Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. v. Esser Int'l, Inc., 467 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (excusable neglect caused by office clerk's mistaken removal and storage of
complaint and summons which had been on lawyer's desk); but see Doane v.
O'Donnell, 467 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Judge Letts, in dissent,
criticizes treatment of clerical error as excusable neglect and chastens majority for
equating "simple negligence with excusable neglect"); Fratus v. Fratus, 467 So. 2d
484, 485 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (failure of "man of little business or legal
experience" to respond to papers served pursuant to long-arm statute constituted excus-
able neglect). Cf. Newkirk v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 464 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (error to set aside default where allegations of excusable neglect and
meritorious defense insufficient, and no supporting affidavit or sworn statement filed);
Rhines v. Rhines, 483 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no excusable neglect in
disregarding summons).
214. See Savela v. Fisher, 464 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (excusa-
ble neglect found where attorneys who represented multiple defendants in same case
inadvertently failed to perceive that date summonses were served on two defendants
differed from date of service on another defendant); Zwickel v. KLC, Inc., 464 So. 2d
1280 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (attorney's failure to timely file responsive pleading
caused by confusion over interrelationship between a pending case and a settled com-
panion case was excusable neglect).
215. In deciding whether an incidence of neglect is excusable, the trial court may
consider as a factor the "diligence demonstrated by the movants upon learning of the
default." Kindle Trucking, 468 So. 2d at 504. See Bayview Tower Condominium Ass'n
v. Schweizer, 475 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (motion to vacate insuffi-
cient for failure to show excusable neglect on part of defendant but rather of insurer in
losing file; lack of due diligence found because insurer took five months to find file after
learning defendant was required to file answer).
216. In a dissolution of marriage action, the court in Whiteside v. Whiteside, 468
So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), held that default is an inappropriate sanc-
tion for contempt. The court stated that default is authorized only under Rules
1.380(b)(2)(C) (failure to comply with a discovery order), 1.200(b) (failure to attend a
pretrial conference), and 1.500(b) (failure to plead or otherwise defend the action), and
expressed concern that due process rights might be violated by a default judgment. See
also Pey v. Turnberry, 474 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (default as
sanction for untimely filing of answers too harsh where answers were due on November
1, were air expressed from Germany on October 29 and filed on November 5); Campa-
gna Constr. Co. v. Riverview Condominium Corp., 467 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (default as sanction for "continued and willful violations of orders of the
court regarding discovery proceedings" affirmed).
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lack of jurisdiction, 21 7 and misrepresentation.218
VII. Dismissal
A. Generally
A motion to dismiss tests whether the plaintiff's complaint is suffi-
cient to state a cause of action. 21 9 The court must consider only the
allegations within the four corners of the complaint.220 The complaint
must contain sufficient allegations of ultimate facts which, if proven,
would entitle the plaintiff to relief.221 The allegations are taken as
true222 and considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
217. Metropolitan Drywall Syss. v. Dudley, 472 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter final default judg-
ment because claim did not exceed $5,000); Gonzalez v. Totalbank, 472 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (final default judgment void for lack of jurisdiction over
the person).
218. See Marine Outlet v. Miner, 469 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(failure to timely file answer constitued excusable neglect where conversations with
plaintiffs' counsel lead insurance adjuster to believe extension of time would be permit-
ted); cf. Moore v. Powell, 480 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (neglect
inexcusable where no reasonable basis for belief that third party's insurance carrier
would handle defense).
219. Abrams v. General Ins. Co., 460 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
220. Id. at 572; Home Says. Ass'n v. Attorney's Title Ins. Fund, 479 So. 2d 191
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Kupperman v. Levine, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
221. See Feagle v. Florida Power & Light Co., 464 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (claim for punitive damages properly dismissed for failure to allege
ultimate facts); Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(allegations sufficient to state cause of action in fraudulent conspiracy); Technicable
Video Syss. v. Americable of Greater Miami, Ltd., 479 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (allegations sufficient to state cause of action on third party beneficiary
theory); Auto World Body & Paint, Inc. v. Sun Elec. Corp., 471 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("bare bones" factual allegations in counterclaims would provide
basis for at least partial relief from claims of plaintiff); Kupperman, 462 So. 2d at 90
(sufficient allegations of dangerous condition in slip and fall case); Frugoli v. Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (allegations sufficient
to withdraw motion to dismiss but not sufficient to permit defendant to adequately
respond; on remand, plaintiff permitted to amend under Rule 1.190); cf. Rishel v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc., 466 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal of negli-
gence action proper for failure to allege willful and wanton misconduct so as to over-
come presumption of nonliability for injuries suffered by police officers and firemen in
discharge of duties).
222. Gilbert v. Oil Conservationists, Inc., 471 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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party.2 23 Any ground upon which a cause of action is stated is sufficient
to preclude dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. 24
Leave to amend a deficient complaint should be given unless the
privilege of amendment has been abused or the face of the complaint
shows the deficiency is incurable.225 Pleadings may be amended in ac-
cordance with Rule 1.190. Failure to allege a specific statutory basis
for suit does not in itself subject a complaint to summary judgment of
dismissal, because the basis for the action may be clarified by
amendment.226
Failure to substitute a personal representative within the ninety
day time limit of Rule 1.260(a) may not be fatal to a claim. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Stroh v. Dudley22" held that the
rule "does not require mandatory, nondiscretionary dismissal even in
light of the terminology 'shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party.' ",228 The court reversed an order of dismissal, stating that the
rule should be liberally construed to permit substitution of parties after
ninety days where mistake, inadvertance, or excusable neglect is
shown. 29 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Downey criticized the major-
ity's invocation of Rule 1.540(b)(1) to override an otherwise mandatory
dismissal for failure to substitute because on the facts of the case the
majority's decision was "tantamount to a holding that ignorance of the
law is excusable neglect. '230
The trial court must not resolve issues of fact,231 weigh evi-
1985); Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
223. Delves v. Kingdom Voice Publications, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
224. Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
225. Unitech Corp. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 472 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (trial court not divested of jurisdiction to vacate order denying rehearing
on order dismissing original complaint with prejudice); Thompson v. McNeill Co., 464
So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to dismiss with prejudice where com-
plaint had been amended only once and no showing privilege had been abused or that
complaint was clearly unamendable).
226. Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
227. 476 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
228. Id. at 231.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 232 (Downey, J., dissenting).
231. L.M. Duncan & Sons v. City of Clearwater, 466 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1985)
(in workers' compensation case, dismissal of third party complaint alleging right of
indemnity premature where factual issue whether city was at fault unresolved).
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dence, 23 2 or consider affirmative defenses' 3 in ruling on the motion. 23 4
Although a court in its discretion may use dismissal as a sanction
for failure to attend a pretrial conference03 5 or for failure to abide by a
legitimate order of the court,2 36 such a drastic remedy should be in-
voked only in extreme circumstances because it punishes the litigant
for his lawyer's shortcomings.237
232. Christie v. General Elec. Corp., 462 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(b) granted at
close of plaintiff's evidence reversed as premature where plaintiff established prima fa-
cie case).
233. N.E. at West Palm Beach, Inc. v. Horowitz, 471 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (court may not consider affirmative defenses or sufficiency of evidence
plaintiff may produce); Thomas v. Soper, 464 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (defenses of laches, statute of limitations, and subsequent assignments improper
grounds for dismissal of contract action); cf. Kulpinski v. City of Tarpon Springs, 473
So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (court may consider defense of statute of
limitations on motion to dismiss where facts constituting defense are affirmatively
stated on face of complaint); City of Clearwater v. United States Steel Corp., 462 So.
2d 1171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defense of res judicata properly considered on
motion to dismiss where stipulation permitted court to judicially notice other proceed-
ings between parties).
234. Home Savs. Ass'n v. Attorneys' Title Ins. Fund, 479 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court properly considered provisions of contract in granting
motion to dismiss) (on motion for rehearing); Kulpinski, 473 So. 2d at 814 (although
statute of limitations should be raised as affirmative defense, it may be raised on mo-
tion to dismiss "only if the facts constituting the defense appear affirmatively on the
face of the complaint."); City of Clearwater v. United States Steel Corp., 462 So. 2d at
1171 (although res judicata should be raised as affirmative defense, it was properly
considered on motion to dismiss where parties stipulated that court should consider and
take judicial notice of all other proceedings between them); Huszar v. Gross, 468 So.
2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in libel action, court on motion to dismiss prop-
erly decided issue whether privilege applied).
235. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200(c).
236. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b), 1.420(b); Livingston v. Department of Correc-
tions, 481 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
237. Id. The court in Livingston reversed a dismissal predicated on the failure of
a lawyer to comply with the terms of a pretrial order. See also Austin v. Papol, 464 So.
2d 1338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal with prejudice without hearing on
failure to appear at deposition reversed as too severe); Jackson v. Layne, 464 So. 2d
1242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal with prejudice of paternity and child
support action for plaintiff's failure to comply with pretrial order requiring parties to
take blood tests where plaintiff not given additional opportunity to comply reversed as
too severe); cf. Wallraf v. T.G.I. Friday's, Inc., 470 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (dismissal with prejudice as sanction under Rule 1.380(d) and 1.380(b)(2)(C)
for discovery violation affirmed; court certified conflict with decision in Rashard v. Cap-
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When an action is dismissed under Rule 1.420, costs are awarded
against the party who sought relief.2 38 When a party voluntarily dis-
misses a claim under Rule 1.420(a)(1)(i) and subsequently commences
another action based on the same claim against the same party, the
court shall tax the costs of the claim previously dismissed against the
party seeking affirmative relief pursuant to Rule 1.420(d).23 9
In a case of first impression, the Third District in MacArthur
Dairy, Inc. v. Guillen2 40 held that a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses
a claim, pays costs to the defendant upon recommencement of an ac-
tion on the claim, and prevails in the second action may recover costs
paid which the defendant would have expended had the claim not been
previously dismissed. 41 The court reasoned that the purpose of Rule
1.420(d) is to discourage the use of voluntary dismissals to abuse de-
fendants and that the new rule would not disserve that purpose.2 42 The
law in the Third District now accords the practice of federal courts of
awarding expenses and costs as one of the terms and conditions of vol-
untary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).243
There is conflict among the districts over whether and to what ex-
tent a trial court may grant relief from judgment under Rule 1.540(b)
following voluntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(a)(1)(i). The courts
have lent disparate interpretations to Randle-Eastern Ambulance Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Vasta,2" in which the Florida Supreme Court ruled that
"voluntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(a)(1)(i) divests the trial court
of jurisdiction to relieve the plaintiff of the dismissal. 2 45 The First and
Second Districts appear to have taken this language at face value,
piali, 171 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), interpreting predecessor of the rule
to preclude use of the sanction against plaintiff).
238. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d).
239. But see Douglas v. Wilson, 472 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(error to render joint judgment for costs on one count of a complaint which was basis
of previously dismissed action but which had been brought in behalf of only one of the
parties).
240. 470 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
241. Id. at 748.
242. Id.
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); see McLaughlin v. Cheshire, 676 F.2d 855 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). It should be noted, however, that the court in MacArthur Dairy modeled
its analysis on a federal court's interepretation of proper practice under Rule 41(a)(2),
rather than on any case interpreting Rule 41(d), the federal counterpart to Florida's
Rule 1.420(d).
244. 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978).
245. Id. at 69.
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while the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts have distinguished Randle-
Eastern and granted limited relief under Rule 1.540(b) after voluntary
dismissal. The cases distinguishing Randle-Eastern indicate that some
courts will consider granting any relief from voluntary dismissal obtain-
able by way of Rule 1.540(b)(3) short of reinstatement of an action.246
Where an action is dismissed by a court sua sponte because of a
clerical error in processing a court's internal documents, the action may
be reinstated pursuant to Rule 1.540(a). 241
246. See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Prescott, 445 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (plaintiff not entitled to reinstatement of action after voluntary dismissal where
second suit would be time-barred by statute of limitations); see also id. at 594-96 (Er-
vin, C.J., specially concurring) (general discussion of divergencies in post-Randle-East-
ern case law and proposal that a question be certified to the Florida Supreme Court:
"Whether a voluntary dismissal divests a trial court of jurisdiction to relieve a plaintiff
of such dismissal when it is alleged, pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(3), that the dismissal
was caused by the fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party?"
Id. at 596); South Florida Nursing Servs. v. Palm Beach Business Servs., 474 So. 2d
1289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Randle-Eastern in finding trial court erred
in reinstating action even where fraud and misrepresentation were alleged); see Ander-
son v. Watson, 475 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to grant plaintiffs'
motion under Rule 1.540(b) to expunge words "with prejudice" from notice of volun-
tary dismissal); Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (plaintiff not entitled to relief from effect of voluntary dismissal where filing of
notice "with prejudice" resulted from secretarial error or excusable neglect); cf.
Shampaigne Indus., Inc. v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 411 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (permitting relief from words "with prejudice," distinguishing Randle-
Eastern as prohibiting reinstatement of action through Rule 1.540(b)(3) but not
prohibiting other relief). The court in Shampaigne Industries certified the following
question, which the supreme court has as yet not answered: "May Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540(b) be used to afford relief if a party can demonstrate that a voluntary
dismissal was filed as the result of secretarial error, mistake, inadvertence or excusable
neglect?" 411 So. 2d at 367. See Bender v. First Fidelity Says. & Loan Ass'n, 463 So.
2d 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (following Shampaigne Industries on similar
facts); Atlantic Assocs. v. Laduzinski, 428 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(same); Siler v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 420 So. 2d 357, 358 n.2 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (error to deny relief from effect of "voluntary dismissal with
prejudice" on basis of Randle-Eastern because that case does not apply to dismissal of
a party but only of action itself; suggesting that Randle-Eastern does "not hold that
proper grounds for relief under Rule 1.540 from a notice of voluntary dismissal can
never be alleged."); Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Wellenreiter, 475 So. 2d 1302
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Randle-Eastern in finding trial court erred in
reinstating action after voluntary dismissal where plaintiff failed to present evidence of
damages on cross-claim and moved to dismiss to avoid adverse ruling on defendant's
motion for directed verdict).
247. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Rolly Marine Serv., Inc., 475 So. 2d
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The Second District in Laursen v. Filardo2 48 held that where the
wrong person is named defendant in a tort action timely commenced,
and the parties stipulate to dismissal with prejudice as to that party
and that the plaintiff would be permitted to file an amended complaint
naming others as defendants, the trial court erred in dismissing the ac-
tion for lack of jurisdiction based on the running of the statute of limi-
tations where the order of dismissal stated that the amended complaint
was deemed filed at the time of dismissal. The district court found the
amended complaint was properly filed with the court under Rule
1.080(e).2 49 The First District in Corcoran v. Federal Land Bank250
found error when a trial court dismissed a counter cross-claim where
the same claim was pending in an action in federal court. The district
court noted that a stay or abatement of a case in one court is the ap-
propriate remedy in instances of concurrent jurisdiction pending deter-
mination of the claim in the court where jurisdiction first attached.
B. Failure to Prosecute
Rule 1.420(e) provides that an action shall be involuntarily dis-
missed for failure to prosecute when there has been no record activity
for a period of one year.251 The one-year period is computed by exclud-
ing the day of the last record activity and including the day the motion
to dismiss is filed. Thus, in Zentmeyer v. Ford Motor Co., 25 the Fifth
District found that where the last record activity was an order filed
265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (wrong form used indicating case was settled rather
than transferred; court to which case was transferred erroneously dismissed, believing
case had been settled in former court).
248. 468 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
249. Id. at 252.
250. 470 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
251. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) provides:
All actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no activ-
ity by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise has occurred for a
period of one year shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on
the motion of any interested person, whether a party to the action or not,
after reasonable notice to the parties, unless a stipulation staying the ac-
tion is approved by the court or a stay order has been filed or a party
shows good cause in writing at least five days before the hearing on the
motion why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period
of less than one year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure
to prosecute.
252. 464 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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October 6, 1982, the one year period began to run on October 7, 1982,
and a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute filed on October 6,
1983, was one day premature.
The record activity must be calculated to move the cause toward
conclusion,2 53 although "[w]here activity is facially sufficient, as op-
posed to merely passive, e.g., a name change . . . [or] substitution of
counsel .... a court cannot inquire further as to how well the activity
advances the cause. ' '254
Record activity sufficient to preclude a dismissal under Rule
1.420(e) includes notice of deposition, although the deposition was
never taken;255 a two-question interrogatory propounded to the defend-
ant;25 16 settlement with one of the plaintiffs; 57 a notice to produce;25 8
and filing a notice of hearing. 59
Before granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 1.420(e), the trial
court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether good
cause is shown so that the action should remain pending.2 ° The stan-
dard applied to determination of good cause on the issue of failure to
prosecute is more strict than that of excusable neglect on the issue of
whether a default judgment should be vacated.2 "6 Good cause "must
include a showing of contact with the opposing party during the one-
year period and some form of excusable conduct or happening other
than negligence or inattention to deadlines. 26 2 The First District Court
of Appeal in Paedae v. Voltaggio263 catalogued several examples of cir-
253. See Grooms v. Garcia, 482 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Hunter v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., 477 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dis-
missal reversed although arguable the act of discovery would not move matter toward
trial posture; benefit of doubt given to nonmovant); Philips v. Marshall Berwick Chev-
rolet, Inc., 467 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (record activity must move
cause toward resolution and not merely represent effort to keep cause on docket).
254. Marshall Berwick Chevrolet, 467 So. 2d at 1069-70.
255. Orange Elec. Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 467 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
256. Marshall Berwick Chevrolet, 467 So. 2d at 1068.
257. Koenig v. Deloite Haskins & Sells, 474 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
258. Hunter, 477 So. 2d at 642.
259. Grooms, 482 So. 2d at 407.
260. Withers v. Flagship Peoples Bank, 473 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
261. Paedae v. Voltaggio, 472 So. 2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
262. Withers, 473 So. 2d at 790.
263. 472 So. 2d at 768.
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cumstances where good cause was not shown.2"4 Abatement and re-
moval of a case from the active case docket by order of the court is
good cause.265 When an action is stayed as to one of the defendants by
federal bankruptcy law, the action may not be dismissed as to any of
the defendants for failure to prosecute.266 The trial court may not dis-
miss for lack of prosecution where the plaintiff gives notice of readiness
for trial and then takes no further action during a one-year period, be-
cause it is the trial court's responsibility to enter an order setting the
trial date.2 67 However, a plaintiff's failure to file any pleading in re-
sponse to a trial court's notice preceeding order of dismissal justifies an
order of dismissal.26 8
VIII. Summary Judgment
Rule 1.510(c) provides that a party may upon motion be granted a
summary judgment if the record "show[s] that there is no genuine is-
sue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."'2 9
The Florida Supreme Court in Moore v. Morris270 summarized
the gloss it has placed on the rule:
[A] party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively
the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the court
must draw every possible inference in favor of the party against
whom a summary judgment is sought .... A summary judgment
should not be granted unless the facts are so crystallized that noth-
ing remains but questions of law ....
If the evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is con-
flicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it
tends to prove the issues, it should be submitted to the jury as a
question of fact to be determined by it .... 271
264. See id. at 769.
265. Rudolph v. Chase, 468 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
266. List v. St. Petersburg Hotel Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
267. Mikos v. Sarasota Cattle Co., 453 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1984).
268. Govayra v. Straubel, 466 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 1985).
269. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
270. 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
271. Id. at 668 (citations omitted). The supreme court in Moore overturned a
summary judgment for the defendants in a medical malpractice case where a factual
issue remained about when the applicable statute of limitations began to run. Id. at
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The standard of review is less deferential to the trial court on a
summary judgment, which is based only a written record, than it is
when the court has heard witnesses or reached a decision after weigh-
ing conflicting evidence.272
The burden is on the movant to demonstrate an absence of genuine
issue of material fact and his entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law.21 3 Once the movant has shown that no issue of material fact exists,
the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce counterevidence
which reveals a genuine issue of material fact.274 Trial courts should
give a strict reading to the movant's filed papers, and a liberal reading
to those of the opposing party.27 5
Where affirmative defenses are raised, a plaintiff seeking summary
judgment must overcome the defenses by presenting evidence which
disproves the facts alleged or establishes that the defenses are legally
insufficient.276
Parties may submit affidavits, depositions, and answers to interrog-
668-70; see also Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 539 (Fla. 1985) (question
of when the "creeping-disease" of asbestosis manifested itself for purposes of statute of
limitations is question of fact which may not be resolved by summary judgment).
272. Savage-Hawk v. Premier Outdoor Prods., Inc., 474 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
273. City of Live Oak v. Arnold, 468 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
274. Golden Hills Golf & Turf Club, Inc. v. Spitzer, 475 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Landers v. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1979)); Jackson v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 469 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (sum-
mary judgment for defendant insurer affirmed, as plaintiff had presented no evidence to
rebut defendant's evidence of written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage); Wil-
liams v. Hunt Bros. Constr. Co., 475 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (sum-
mary judgment for defendant affirmed in malicious prosecution action where plaintiff
failed to rebut conclusive presumption created by magistrate's finding of probable
cause to issue warrant through record evidence of fraud or corrupt means used by one
who initiated prosecution); Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 469 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Blits v. Blits, 468 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (in will contest, summary judgment for defendant affirmed on issue of proper
execution where plaintiff failed to rebut prima facie case of formal execution by prov-
ing facts sufficient to support revocation).
275. Swift Indep. Packing Co. v. Basic Food Int'l, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1017 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
276. O'Neal v. Brady, 476 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Fischer v.
Rodriguez-Capriles, 472 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Home Health
Servs. v. McQuay-Garrot, Sullivan & Co., 462 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); International Commercial Properties, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 462 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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atories in support of their relative positions on a motion for summary
judgment. 77 In Cary v. Keene Corp.,2"' the First District reversed a
summary judgment after finding that the trial court should not have
excluded the plaintiff's affidavit, which contradicted his earlier deposi-
tion testimony. The court noted the rule that a party may not create an
issue of fact by repudiating or contradicting his own deposition testi-
mony by affidavit.279 However, the court found that this case fit under
an exception to that rule providing that an affidavit which presents a
credible explanation for the discrepancy may be sufficient to establish
that a factual issue is before the court.280 The First District in Marlar
v. Quincy State Bank281 reversed a summary judgment where the trial
court erroneously relied on an affidavit which was not served and filed
by the movant at least twenty days before the hearing, as required by
Rule 1.510(c). The rule is designed to provide the opposing party an
opportunity to prepare a challenge to the factual basis of the motion.282
The court found the affidavit was not authorized by Rule 1.510(e),
holding that, under the rule, "a movant may file supplemental affidavits
less than twenty days prior to the summary judgment hearing only
upon written stipulation and agreement by the adverse party affected
or upon leave of court granted by written order after written applica-
tion, notice to the adverse party, and the opportunity for a hearing. '283
If the provisions of a contract are susceptible of different infer-
ences, summary judgment is inappropriate where the inferences must
be resolved by determination of fact.284 Summary judgment is appro-
277. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a), (b), (e); see Montejo Invs., N.V. v. Green Compa-
nies, Inc., 471 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (supporting affidavit insuffi-
cient for failure to comply with Rule 1.5 10(e)); Testa v. Pfaff, 464 So. 2d 220, (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affidavits insufficient because based on ultimate facts or conclu-
sions of fact without stating facts which would support such conclusions); Evens v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary
judgment for defendant affirmed where uncontroverted affidavits negated existence of
element of tort).
278. 472 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
279. Id. at 853.
280. Id.; accord R & W Farm Equip. Co. v. Fiat Credit Corp., 466 So. 2d 407
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
281. 463 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
282. Id. at 1233.
283. Id.
284. See Baugher v. Banker's Life Co., 471 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (summary judgment for insurer reversed where different inferences could be
drawn from provisions of life insurance contract and amount of death benefits payable);
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priate where "no interpretation of the undisputed material facts would
support a finding of liability."28
IX. Directed Verdict
A motion for directed verdict must be made at the close of all the
evidence or the opportunity is waived.2" 6 An exception is made where
there is a total lack of evidence to support the verdict.287 When there is
evidence in the record about which reasonable people could differ, a
jury issue of liability or damages is raised and the motion may not
properly be granted.28 The evidence must be considered in a light most
Miranda v. Julian, 463 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment
reversed where contract contained latent ambiguity); Master Antenna Syss. v. Number
One Condominium Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (ambiguity in
master television system contracts precluded summary judgment); cf. Tampa Port
Auth. v. Tampa Barge Servs., Inc., 463 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
("[m]ere contractual ambiguity does not necessarily preclude summary judgment";
summary judgment affirmed where evidence showed parties had given same interpreta-
tion to an ambiguity).
285. Clark v. Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed on negligence suit arising from
diving accident on canoe trip; defendant sustained its burden of showing there was no
evidence to indicate a breach of duty causing injury); Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgom-
ery, Inc., 469 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment for em-
ployer proper where Worker's Compensation Act provided exclusive remedy precluding
suit alleging battery and intentional infliction of mental distress where male supervisor
was alleged to have grabbed employee's breast); cf. Robbins v. Department of Natural
Resources, 468 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment for
defendant DNR in diving accident case improper where DNR failed to conclusively
establish facts going to element of defense of assumption of risk and failed to demon-
strate it was not negligent or that plaintiff was solely responsible for his own injuries);
see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Weathers Bros., 453 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed where plaintiff failed to introduce
bill of lading upon which issue of liability was predicated); Reina v. Gingerale Corp.,
472 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment for defendant af-
firmed where complaint failed to allege factual predicate upon which liability could be
based).
286. The court in Waltman v. Prime Motor Inns, Inc., 480 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla.
1985), articulated the general rule that "one who submits his cause to the trier of fact
without first moving for directed verdict at the end of all evidence has waived the right
to make that motion."
287. Sundale Assocs. v. Southeast Bank, 471 So. 2d 100, 102 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
288. See Fayden v. Guerrero, 474 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(conflicting evidence about liability); R.A. Jones & Sons v. Holman, 470 So. 2d 60
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favorable to the nonmovant. s8 A directed verdict is improper if any
record evidence would support a jury verdict. 90 A directed verdict is
proper where the record does not support a jury issue,291 as where the
evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn from it
point to but one possible conclusion.2 92 A directed verdict is proper
where there is no evidence to support a party's position, 9 3 no rebuttal
of a legal presumption,294 no recognized legal theory upon which liabil-
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in contract action, factual issues about breaches of
warranties presented); Curran v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 469 So. 2d 872 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (factual issue about hospital's participation in and control over
construction project precluded directed verdict on ground of immunity conferred by
workers' compensation law); Sistrunk v. Douglas, 468 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (in negligence action, issue whether defendant acted reasonably under the
circumstances); Wills v. Snapper Creek Nursing Home, 465 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (issue whether husband suffered loss of consortium).
289. E.g., Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
290. See id.
291. Roshkind v. Fay, 474 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (issue of
tortious interference with business relationship not supported in record); Kalivas v.
Miller, 473 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (uncontradicted evidence estab-
lished claim to liability for assault); Schimmel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 464 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (uncontradicted evidence
proved liability for amount overdrawn from account).
292. See Trend Realty, Inc. v. Bullard, 461 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Williams v. Meyer, 474 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
293. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vosburgh, 480 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no evidence of comparative negligence); Williams v. Meyer, 474
So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in wrongful death action, no evidence
driver of car could have avoided hitting child); Tri-County Truss Co. v. Leonard, 467
So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no evidence to support comparative negli-
gence defense to strict liability claim); Sussman v. City of Daytona Beach, 462 So. 2d
595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution, no evidence of facts relied upon by police to find probable
cause); cf. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Parker, 472 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (although plaintiff did not introduce signed parental consent form
which would by statute establish liability for minor child's automobile accident, di-
rected verdict improper where evidence of routine practice of licensing agency created
factual issue of whether parents signed); Ray-Mar Beauty College, Inc. v. Ellis Rubin
Law Offices, P.A., 475 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evidence supported
punitive damages claim); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kimmel, 465 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evidence walkway was built contrary to building code supported
claim of negligence).
294. Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (presump-
tion of negligence which attaches to driver of rear vehicle in rear-end collision not
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ity could be predicated,2 9 5 where the defendant's conduct was not the
legal cause of injury,298 or where the minimum legal standard of culpa-
bility was not met.297
X. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata is invoked as an affirmative defense 298
to bar a suit where substantially the same claim or cause of action has
rebutted).
295. NN Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Professional Group, Inc., 468 So. 2d 532 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Florida does not recognize tort of economic duress).
296. See Florida Power and Light Co. v. Lively, 465 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (no duty or breach of duty on part of utility where airplane collided
with electrical lines, as accident was not foreseeable); Caranna v. Eades, 466 So. 2d
259 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no duty of city to inspect vertical openings in bal-
cony railings through which child fell).
In Snow v. Nelson, 475 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1985), the supreme court decided that a
directed verdict was proper where the evidence would not support a finding of parental
liability for a child's tortious conduct under the restrictive rule of Gissen v. Goodwill,
80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955). See generally Note, Liability of Parents for Negligent
Supervision of Their Minor Children, 12 FLA. S. U.L. REV. 935 (1985); Note, Paren-
tal Liability for the Torts of Their Minor Children: Limits, Logic & Legality, 9 NOVA
L.J. 205 (1984).
297. The supreme court in Como Oil Co., v. O'Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.
1985), held that a directed verdict was proper on a claim for punitive damages where
the trial court found the evidence showed only gross negligence of the defendant. The
court stated that "the degree of negligence necessary for punitive damages is willful
and wanton misconduct equivalent to criminal manslaughter." Id. at 1062. In a sepa-
rate opinion, Justice Shaw, joined by Justice Ehrlich, stated that the lines drawn be-
tween the relative degrees of negligence are indistinct and are matters of public policy.
These justices thought the evidence was sufficient in that case to preclude a directed
verdict. Id. at 1063.
The court in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Robinson, 472 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1985),
held that a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages was improper on the
evidence presented in a malicious prosecution action. The court decided that the higher
standard of negligence necessary to support a finding of vicarious liability for punitive
damages under Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1981),
was inapplicable because the allegations, proof, and jury verdict were predicated on a
theory that the corporate defendant, rather than an agent, "acted with malice, moral
turpitude, wantonness, willfulness or reckless indifference to the rights of others ..
Id. at 723.
298. City of Clearwater v. United States Steel Corp., 469 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defense of res judicata properly raised in motion to dismiss
where parties stipulated that court should take judicial notice of earlier proceedings
between them).
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been finally adjudicated in a prior proceeding.2 99 The doctrine is appli-
cable only where the suits involve overlapping identities of "the thing
sued for .... the causes of action . . . , [the] persons and parties ....
[and] the quality or capacity of the persons for or against whom the
claim is made." 300 The prior adjudication must have been final.30 1
The First District Court of Appeal in Thomson v. Petherbridge°2
ruled that the doctrine operated to bar a suit where an earlier action to
reform and enforce payment on a note was dismissed with prejudice for
lack of consideration, although the subsequent action was brought to
enforce the underlying debt rather than the note itself. The court stated
that the doctrine applies where the causes of action are "substantially
the same," and that the "[i]dentity of causes of action is defined by
similarity of the facts essential to the maintenance of both actions. '"303
The court found that both actions involved identical facts because the
suit on the debt was necessarily predicated on the same debt contract
adjudicated unenforceable in the earlier action. 304
Because "a partnership is not a legal entity apart from the mem-
bers composing it,"30 5 a summary final judgment for the partners in
their capacity as individuals may operate through the doctrine of res
judicata to bar a subsequent suit designating those individuals as part-
ners in a partnership. 306
A party may be estopped from pleading res judicata upon taking
299. Thomson v. Petherbridge, 472 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
300. Husky Indus., Inc. v. Griffith, 422 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1982), quoted in Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 775.
301. Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 774.
302. See id. at 773; State v. LaPlante, 470 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (doctrine inapplicable where "no clear cut former adjudication"); Falkner
v. Amerifirst Fed. Says. and Loan Assoc., 467 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(trial court correctly entered judgment of dismissal on ground of res judicata where no
rehearing or appeal was timely sought from earlier order of dismissal).
303. Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 775 (quoting Pumo v. Pumo, 405 So. 2d 224, 226
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
304. Id. at 775.
305. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Fike, 304 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
306. See Olympian West Condominium Ass'n v. B.K., Inc., 467 So. 2d 413 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Thus, the absence of the fourth "identity" under the test of
Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 775, does not prevent application of the doctrine at least in the
context of a partnership although the suits name the same persons in different
capacities.
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inconsistent positions in separate suits where the opposing party would
be injured.30 7 The Fifth District in Wooten v. Rhodus3 8 decided that it
would be unfair to give res judicata effect to a dissolution judgment so
as to bar a subsequent suit brought by Wooten to determine his interest
in real property owned as tenants in common at the time of dissolution.
In the dissolution action, Rhodus had moved to dismiss Wooten's coun-
terclaim through which Wooten had sought to have his rights in the
property adjudicated. Rhodus asserted that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to determine the interests in the property and that the determina-
tion should be made in a subsequent partition suit. Wooten acquiesced
by dropping his counterclaim. When Wooten later brought a partition
suit, Rhodus raised the defense of res judicata, arguing that the inter-
ests were adjudicated by the dissolution judgment. Finding that
Rhodus' contrary positions in court would operate unfairly to deny
Wooten his day in court, the district court disallowed the defense and
ordered the case tried on its merits.
Where a "motion merely renews the allegations upon which relief
was previously denied, the doctrine of res judicata precludes relitiga-
tion of the issue presented."309
The doctrine of res judicata operates to bar relief from final judg-
ment under Rule 1.540(b) even where there is a change in the control-
ling rule of law in a later unrelated case.310
Where the verdict for a plaintiff in a personal injury suit does not
apportion responsibility for damages among joint tortfeasors, the doc-
trine operates to bar a subsequent suit against one jointly liable.31" '
Thus, the Second District Court of Appeal in Roberts v. Rockwell In-
ternational Corp.31 2 affirmed a summary judgment for the manufac-
turer of a saw which injured the plaintiffs hand, where the plaintiff
had earlier recovered in a negligence action against the county whose
ambulance transporting the plaintiff had broken down enroute to the
hospital. The plaintiff had "affirmatively argued to the jury that appor-
tionment was not possible."3 ' Because the plaintiff failed to obtain a
307. Wooten v. Rhodus, 470 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
308. 470 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
309. Streater v. Stamper, 466 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
310. Theisen v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
311. See Roberts v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 462 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 506.
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special verdict finding the damages apportionable, the court reasoned
that the defendants were joint tortfeasors, and the adjudication of the
liability of one precluded a subsequent adjudication as to the other who
was not named in the earlier suit.
XI. Stays and Injunctions
A. Stays
Removal of a civil action to federal district court is governed by
federal statute.314 Claims over which federal courts have original juris-
diction are removable. Nonremovable claims joined with removable
claims may be decided by a federal court through its pendent jurisdic-
tion. 315 The plaintiffs in Sunshine State Service Corp. v. Dove Invest-
ments316 filed suit in state court on a claim over which the federal
courts did not have concurrent jurisdiction. Defendants filed counter-
claims and also filed claims in federal district court predicated on fed-
eral statutes. Not all the defendants in the state action were named in
the federal action. Defendants invoked the pendent jurisdiction of the
federal court by joining the counterclaims. The defendants then moved
to stay the proceedings in the state court. The motion was granted and
the Fifth District reversed. The district court extrapolated a rule from
an opinion of the Florida Supreme Court3 17 providing that "a stay of a
subsequently filed action in a court of concurrent jurisdiction involving
the same parties and same subject matter is appropriate." '318 The dis-
trict court applied the rule even though the courts did not have concur-
rent jurisdiction and found that the conditions of the rule were not met
because the parties were not identical. The court further found that the
stay should not have been granted because, as a general rule in matters
of concurrent jurisdiction, the court whose jurisdiction is first invoked
has exclusive jurisdiction over the cause.
The court in Cole v. Douglas31 9 quashed a trial court's order stay-
ing part of a complaint first filed in state court and five years later filed
in federal court. The court characterized the filing in federal court as a
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
316. 468 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 478 So.
2d 53 (Fla. 1985).
317. Wade v. Clower, 114 So. 548 (Fla. 1927).
318. Sunshine State, 468 So. 2d at 283 (emphasis in original deleted).
319. 464 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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dilatory tactics and said that "stays should be rare, and the circum-
stances of each case should be scrutinized carefully to preclude manip-
ulation of the state and federal court systems." ''
In Robinson v. Royal Bank of Canada,22 the Fourth District
reached an opposite conclusion in a case in which a Canadian court
had prior and concurrent jurisdiction over an essentially identical ac-
tion. The trial court should have "decline[d] jurisdiction as a matter of
comity." 323
B. Injunctions
The Second District Court of Appeal in Lingelbach's Bavarian
Restaurants, Inc. v. Del Bello324 analyzed the procedure for obtaining a
temporary injunction under Rule 1.610(a) and decided that the remedy
is appropriately sought through a verified motion for preliminary in-
junction. The nonmovant argued that under Deanza Corp. v. Vo-
noflororio 25 injunctive relief must be sought by "pleading" rather than
"motion. 3 26 The court concluded that an amendment 327 had harmo-
nized Florida's rule with its counterpart, Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 65(a)(2), which provides that injunctive relief is sought by "appli-
cation for a preliminary injunction." The district court reasoned that
under Florida Rule 1.100(b), an application for relief is made by mo-
tion; therefore, a motion, rather than a pleading, is the proper mecha-
nism for seeking temporary injunctive relief under Rule 1.610. The
court went on to find that the motion itself did not contain the allega-
tions customarily required to gain injunctive relief, and that the mo-
tion, notice, and hearing combined to make the procedure by which
relief was granted fair.
320. Id. at 231.
321. Id.
322. 462 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
323. Id. at 102.
324. 467 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So.
2d 674 (Fla. 1985).
325. 393 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
326. Id. at 1146-47.
327. In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1980).
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XII. Costs and Interest
A. Costs
1. Generally
Section 57.041 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[t]he party
recovering judgment shall recover all his legal costs and charges which
shall be included in the judgment .... -121 Nevertheless, a trial court
has discretion whether to award costs after judgment.3 29 The party
against whom costs are to be taxed must be given opportunity to chal-
lenge the items claimed as costs by presenting argument and evi-
dence.3 30 Parties need not specifically plead costs, as they do not consti-
tute part of the relief sought from damages claimed. 331 Courts take a
liberal view of the time when a motion for trial costs may be filed.
33 2
Costs incurred in an appeal "shall be taxed in favor of the prevail-
ing party unless the court orders otherwise. 3 33 A motion for appellate
costs must be filed within thirty days after the appellate court's man-
date issues .3 3 The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a mo-
tion to tax costs is one of a clear showing of abuse of discretion.33 5
Costs of depositions may be taxed against a losing party if the
depositions "serve a useful purpose, even though not introduced into
evidence."336 Where the terms of a settlement agreement between par-
ties to the original action require the parties to pay their own costs, a
third party defendant who also asserts a derivative claim as a counter-
328. FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1985).
329. Goslin v. Racal Data Communications, Inc., 468 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1985).
330. Morgan v. Plantation-Sysco, 471 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
331. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1327 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
332. "[A] motion to tax costs may be filed at various times, before or after judg-
ment, and even after an appeal of the judgment has been taken, so long as the motion
is filed within a reasonable time after the appeal is concluded." Id. (attorney's fees
taxable as costs pursuant to federal statute although motion for fees made after entry
of final judgment and no prayer for fees was stated in complaint).
333. FLA. R. App. P. 9.400(a).
334. Id.; see Thornburg v. Pursell, 476 So. 2d 323, 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
335. Goslin, 468 So. 2d at 392 (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to tax
costs of trial transcript).
336. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Vote, 463 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
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claim may not be taxed with costs which are required to be paid under
the agreement.337 Costs paid by a plaintiff upon recommencement of an
action voluntarily dismissed may be recovered to the extent of the costs
the defendant would have expended had the claim not been previously
dismissed.3 38
Rule 1.442 provides that where the amount recovered by a suc-
cessful plaintiff does not exceed the amount of a properly served offer
of judgment, the plaintiff must pay the costs incurred by the defendant
after the offer was made. 89 Separate offers from multiple defendants
may not be aggregated; rather, the rule applies only when the plaintiff
fails to recover an amount greater than the highest single offer. 34°
The First District in Douglas v. Wilson 41 decided that the trial
court erred in awarding a joint judgment for costs under Rule 1.420(d)
to the extent of costs incurred in preparing to defend one count which
stated a cause of action by only one of the plaintiffs. 342 The Second
District in American Bank of Lakeland v. Hooven3 found that a trial
court erred in taxing as costs the defendant's attorney's fees and travel
expenses as a sanction against the plaintiff for misconduct of its attor-
ney. The trial court found the objectionable conduct directly resulted in
a mistrial, at substantial cost to the opposing parties. The district court
reasoned that such a sanction is improper where the attorney is not
accused or found guilty of contempt.
2. Expert Witnesses
The supreme court in Travieso v. Travieso344 held that "pursuant
to Section 92.231, expert witness fees, at the discretion of the trial
court, may be taxed as costs for a lawyer who testifies as an expert as
337. Caranna v. Eades, 466 So. 2d 259, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
338. See MacArthur Dairy, Inc. v. Guillen, 470 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); see also supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
339. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
340. Thornburg, 476 So. 2d at 324.
341. 472 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
342. See also Okuboye v. Hubert Rutland Hosp., 466 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985) (physician who suc-
cessfully defended malpractice suit not entitled to indemnity from joint tortfeasor hos-
pital for attorney's fees and costs where record showed plaintiff attempted to prove
active rather than passive negligence).
343. 471 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
344. 474 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1985).
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to reasonable attorney's fees."' 345 The court expressed its preference
that attorneys so testify as a courtesy and expect compensation only
"where the time required for preparation and testifying is burden-
some."346 In a separate opinion, Justice Ehrlich noted the mandatory
language "shall be allowed a witness fee"3 47 and disagreed with the
majority's treatment of that provision as permissive.348 He nevertheless
agreed with the majority that a lawyer called to testify about fees gen-
erally should do so without charge as a courtesy. Justice Overton, in
dissent, would have modified the principle that a court must hear ex-
pert testimony before awarding attorney's fees. He suggested that the
determination whether testimony was needed might be left to the attor-
neys and trial court. The Justice reasoned that testimony about the
value of other experts' services is not required, and that testimony
about attorney's fees may unnecessarily add to the cost of litigation.3 49
The Travieso decision served as the basis for the decision by the
Second District in Straus v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Foundation,
InC.3 50 The district court added its gloss by construing the holding in
Travieso as making the "award of such expert fees discretionary only
where the testifying attorney expert does not expect to be compensated
for that testimony." 351 Thus, if an attorney testifies as an expert with
the expectation of compensation, the trial court must tax her fee as a
cost.
The First District in Digital Systems of Florida, Inc. v. Com-
mitte 52 affirmed a denial of the plaintiff's motion for costs where the
expert fees were not broken down in such a manner that any charges
not properly includable as costs would be revealed. 353 The same court
345. Id. at 1185 (emphasis added).
346. Id. at 1186.
347. FLA. STAT. § 92.231 (1983) (emphasis added).
348. Travieso, 474 So. 2d at 1187 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
349. Id. at 1188 (Overton, J., dissenting).
350. 478 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
351. Id. at 473.
352. 472 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for review denied,
482 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1986).
353. In an administrative order, the Florida Supreme Court has issued guidelines
for taxation of costs in civil actions. The guidelines address taxation of costs of expert
witnesses and comment on whether certain of those costs should be taxable. See State-
wide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions in Reeser v. Boats
Unlimited, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1346, 1349 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), reprinted in
FLORIDA RULES OF COURT 559 (West 1986).
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in Thursby v. Reynolds Metal Co. 354 found no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's order taxing expert witness costs, although no evidence
was presented showing the time the experts actually spent in prepara-
tion of their testimony. The court reasoned that the trial court's knowl-
edge of the length and the nature of the testimony given enabled it to
determine a reasonable fee. Also, the fees taxed did not appear grossly
excessive to the appellate court.3 55
B. Interest
1. Prejudgment Interest on Pecuniary Losses
Prejudgment interest is an element of pecuniary damage35 which,
when properly pled,357 is awarded as a matter of right in actions for
damages to property.3 58 The policy behind awarding prejudgment inter-
est is to encourage settlement of claims. 359 "[P]rejudgment interest is
not recoverable on awards for personal injury."3 60
The supreme court in Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing
Co.3 16 held that "when a verdict liquidates damages on a plaintiffs out-
of-pocket, pecuniary losses, plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to
prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of that
loss. ''se2 The court thus resolved a conflict among the districts over
whether prejudgment interest should be awarded on unliquidated
claims for damages. The Fourth District had held that prejudgment
354. 466 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So.
2d 676 (Fla. 1985).
355. Id. at 252.
356. A.R.A. Servs., Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 474 So. 2d 396
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
357. See Harry E. Robbins Assocs. v. Sudbury, 467 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
358. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla.
1985); Zorn v. Britton, 120 Fla. 304, 162 So. 879 (1935), cited in A.R.A. Servs., 474
So. 2d at 396 n.1.
359. A.R.A. Services, 474 So. 2d at 396 n.1.
360. Argonaut, 474 So. 2d at 214 n.1. The court in Argonaut implied that it
might permit an award of prejudgment interest in a personal injury action. The court
noted that the rule of Zorn stemmed from a trial court's failure to apportion property
loss and personal injury damages. Id. The court may thus be indicating a willingness to
extend the scope of permissible awards of prejudgment interest to include such awards
on personal injury damages.
361. Id. at 212.
362. Id. at 215.
[Vol. 10
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/1
Civil Procedure
interest could not be awarded where the presence of a comparative neg-
ligence claim created uncertainty about the award of damages." 3 The
claim was viewed as unliquidated and therefore incapable of supporting
an award of interest. The First District had adopted a "better rule"
providing that "for the purpose of assessing prejudgment interest, a
claim becomes liquidated and susceptible of prejudgment interest when
a verdict has the effect of fixing damages as of a prior date."364
The supreme court approved the view of the First District and
quashed the decision of the Fourth District, but decided the case on the
basis of two nineteenth-century decisions from which the court had not
receded. 36 5 In reannouncing the law of prejudgment interest, the su-
preme court removed from the province of the jury any consideration of
interest in finding the amount of damages. Rather, "[o]nce a verdict
has liquidated damages as of a date certain,"3 6 the trial judge or clerk
is to do the mathematical computation of interest according to section
687.01 of the Florida Statutes. The rule of Argonaut Insurance has
since been applied by the district courts.367
2. Interest on Interpleaded Funds
Generally, no interest is allowable on funds deposited with a
court. 3 8 However, interest is allowable on disputed funds which a court
has ordered deposited in an interest-bearing account.3 69 "[I]nterest
earned on interpleaded and deposited funds follows the principal and
363. Id. at 213-14; see Chicago Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 451 So. 2d 876
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
364. Bergen Brunswig Corp. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs.,
415 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition for review denied, 426 So.
2d 25 (Fla. 1983).
365. See Argonaut, 474 So. 2d at 214-15.
366. Id. at 215.
367. See Morcyl Distrib. Co. v. Farrelly, 477 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985), petition for review denied, 486 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1986) (awarding prejudgment
interest on damages arising from breach of subdistributorship agreement); Hurley v.
Slingerland, 461 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming award of pre-
judgment interest on damages sustained by limited partner arising from general part-
ner's self-dealing); A.R.A. Servs., Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 474 So.
2d 396 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985 (awarding prejudgment interest on damages to
airplane).
368. Burnett v. Brito, 478 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
369. Id. at 849.
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shall be allocated to whomever is found entitled to the principal. 37 0
Thus, the Third District in Burnett v. Brito37' decided that a defendant
real estate broker was liable to a prevailing plaintiff for interest on
money advanced to the broker where the broker delayed in complying
with a court order to deposit the money in an interest-bearing account.
XIII. Relief from Judgment
Rule 1.540 provides for relief from judgments, decrees, or orders
on bases which include clerical mistakes, mistakes, inadvertence, excus-
able neglect, 7 2 newly discovered evidence, 3  fraud,374 voidness,3 75 sat-
370. Id.
371. 478 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
372. Williams v. Roundtree, 464 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(relief granted from effect of failure to timely file notice of appeal on bases of clerical
error and excusable neglect where judicial assistant gave erroneous information about
date decision was rendered; trial court would be permitted to set aside judgment and
re-enter at later date to permit timely perfection of appeal).
373. Kline v. Belco, Ltd., 480 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition
for review denied, 491 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1986) (new trial ordered on basis of new evi-
dence of tax records which controverted false testimony of adverse witness whose testi-
mony had damaged plaintiff's credibility).
374. See generally DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984); Comment,
Rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure: In Search of an Equitable Standard
for Relief from Fraud, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 851 (1985); see Gomez v. Espinosa, 466
So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to grant relief under rule on basis of
extrinsic fraud upon the court by misrepresentation where unsuccessful party not pre-
vented from participating in action, or on intrinsic fraud where alleged fraudulent con-
duct in the proceeding did not pertain to the issues tried; Rule 1.540 may not be used
as substitute for appeal to attack ruling on jurisdiction); Streater v. Stampes, 466 So.
2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (motion to vacate adjudication of paternity based
on intrinsic fraud - perjury - must be brought within one year; under Rule 1.540(b)
relief predicated on intrinsic fraud may not be obtained after one year through provi-
sion of rule authorizing independent action; however, extrinsic fraud may be raised
under rule later than one year); Weitzman v. F.I.F. Consultants, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1085,
1087 n.3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla.
1985) (discussing time for bringing motion under Rule 1.540(b) for relief from intrin-
sic and extrinsic fraud).
375. See generally DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 375; Whigham v. Whigham, 464 So.
2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 475 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1985)
(void judgment may be attacked at any time under Rule 1.540(b)); Kuehne & Nagel,
Inc. v. Esser Int'l, Inc., 467 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to deny
motion to vacate default under Rules 1.500(d) and 1.540(b) on evidence which showed
one day delay in filing answer was caused by excusable neglect when lawyer's clerk
mishandled complaint and summons); Palmer v. Palmer, 479 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th Dist.
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isfaction, 37 6 or inequity of prospective application.3 77
Clerical mistakes "may be corrected by the court at any time on
its own initiative or on the motion of any party ... *"378 The charac-
terization given an error is determinative of the proper mode of relief.
"Clerical" errors may be remedied at any time under Rule 1.540(a).
Where a written order does not accurately reflect the terms of a settle-
ment agreement announced in open court, the error is clerical and may
be remedied under that rule. 79 Errors of "inadvertance," which result
from a court's failure to order something it meant to order, may be
remedied through timely motion under Rule 1.540(b).380 "Judicial" er-
rors arise when a court intentionally orders something which is legally
erroneous. This kind of error must be remedied through direct ap-
peal.38' The Fourth District Court of Appeal in In re Estate of
Beeman382 announced a test for distinguishing clerical from judicial er-
ror as "whether or not the court reached a decision in the intentional or
purposeful exercise of its judicial function. If the pronouncement re-
flects a deliberate choice on the part of the court, the act is judicial;
errors of this nature are to be cured by appeal. 38 3
A related question arises in the consideration of what error may be
remedied through Rule 1.540. Some courts have ruled that substantive
change in a judgment may not be effected through the rule. This con-
clusion is reached by equating the labels "substantive error" and "judi-
Ct. App. 1985) (error to grant motion for relief under Rule 1.540(b) on basis judgment
was void for lack of jurisdiction where judgment was not void but voidable).
376. See Security Ins. Co. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 471 So. 2d 1302
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (satisfaction of judgment extinguishes any remaining
rights in the judgment).
377. See Weitzman, 468 So. 2d at 1085 (on motion for relief under Rule
1.540(b)(5), district court remanded for cancellation of record of judgment obtained
through stock fraud scheme, where perpetrator of fraud purchased and was assigned
the judgment and sought to enforce it against defrauded party).
378. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a).
379. See Marks v. Wertalka, 475 So. 2d 273, 274 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
380. See Mills v. Mills, 353 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (trial
court's failure to rule on attorney's fees remediable upon timely motion under Rule
1.540(b)).
381. See Marks, 475 So. 2d at 274 n.2.
382. 391 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
383. Id. at 281, quoted in Pompano Atlantis Condominium Assoc. v. Marlino,
415 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (tardy motion for clarification
under Rule 1.540 could not be treated as motion for relief under Rule 1.540 because
the error attempted to be remedied was judicial and not clerical or inadvertent).
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cial error." Thus the Second District Court of Appeal in Clearwater
Oaks Bank v. Plumtree314 decided that a nunc pro tunc judgment
amending an order relating to fees was void because the trial court was
without jurisdiction. The district court stated that a substantive change
in a judgment must be pursued under Rule 1.530(g), and not under
Rule 1.540; the court followed with a statement that "[t]he remedies
permitted through Rule 1.540 do not apply to judicial errors." 315 While
the latter statement is generally accepted as true, it does not follow
that all substantive inaccuracies in a judgment stem from judicial er-
ror. Further, such an approach introduces definitional problems into the
equation, for after a court decides that the criteria in Rule 1.540(b) are
met, it must determine whether a proposed change would alter the sub-
stance of the judgment. Because any change to a judgment may be
viewed as substantive, the reach of Rule 1.540(b) would thus be so
severely circumscribed as to render it of no practical use. Rule 1.530(g)
expressly provides that it "does not affect the remedies in Rule
1.540(b)." Where a party meets the restrictive criteria for relief under
Rule 1.540(b), a court's ability to fashion a remedy should not be fur-
ther affected by a limiting notion of substance.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Peters v. Peters386 has
taken the better view by stating that errors in the substance of an order
may not be corrected through Rule 1.540(a), but may be corrected
upon timely motion under Rule 1.540(b). The court indicated that it
would have permitted correction of a contempt order to change the
amount of child support arrearages had a motion under the latter rule
been timely filed. 317 A need for relief in that case arose because the
judgment was predicated on incorrect financial information given by a
governmental agency.
The court must, of course, have jurisdiction to grant relief. Thus,
where a motion for relief is not brought under Rule 1.540(b)(1)-(3)
within "one year after the judgment, decree, order or proceeding was
entered or taken," the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under
the rule.3 "8 Although Rule 1.540(b) provides that motions under sub-
384. 477 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
385. Id. at 1025.
386. 479 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
387. Id. at 841.
388. See Marks, 475 So. 2d at 274 (where a judgment debtor went bankrupt
several years after a settlement and agreed final judgment was entered, and plaintiff
moved to "correct and amend" judgment to add other names as judgment debtors,
relief could not be obtained under Rule 1.540(b) because motion was untimely); cf.
[Vol. 10
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section (b)(1), (2), and (3) must be made within one year, motions
under subsection (b)(4) and (5) must be made "within a reasonable
time." The requirement of reasonableness of time may no longer be
applicable to motions alleging voidness for lack of jurisdiction. The
Fifth District in Whigham v. Whigham 89 explained that "a void judg-
ment may be attacked 'at any time' because such judgment creates no
binding obligation upon the parties, is legally ineffective, and is a nul-
lity. ' ' 390 Relief from judgment obtained through fraud upon a court
may be sought later than one year by an independent action.3 91
The applicable standard of review of a grant or denial of relief
under the rule is one of gross abuse of discretion.3 92 An order setting
aside a judgment must be supported by a basis in the record.39 3 Under
Rule 1.540, relief may be sought from a settlement,394 offer of judg-
ment,'3 5 or summary judgment.396 Relief may not be obtained merely
because of a change in an applicable rule of law.3 97
Chang v. Chang, 469 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (divorce judgment
entered in 1969 could be attacked by motion filed in 1982 alleging voidness for lack of
jurisdiction because of ineffective service of process).
389. 464 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So.
2d 696 (Fla. 1985).
390. Id. at 676.
391. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
392. Rhines v. Rhines, 483 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for
review denied, 488 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1986).
393. Citibank v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 478 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
394. See Vantage Broadcasting Co. v. WINT Radio, Inc., 476 So. 2d 796 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to deny defendant relief under Rule 1.540(b) where
evidence failed to establish that his attorney had authority to settle claim); Mortgage
Corp. of America v. Inland Constr. Co., 463 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
petition for review denied, 475 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1985) (error to deny motion to vacate
judgment made during pendency of appeal where parties reached settlement).
395. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Volkswagen South, Inc., 471 So. 2d
585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for review denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1986)
(no error in denial of relief from offered judgment which contained unilateral mistake
as result of inexcusable lack of due care).
396. See Ratner v. Garson, 475 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (mo-
tion for relief from final summary judgment modifying indemnity agreement proper
under 1.540(b)(5); however, no genuine issue of fact shown).
397. Theisen v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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